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This Article is the first to examine “war manifestos,” documents that set out the 
legal reasons sovereigns provided for going to war from the late fifteenth through 
the mid-twentieth centuries. We have assembled the world’s largest collection of war 
manifestos—over 350—in languages as diverse as Classical Chinese, German, 
French, Latin, Serbo-Croatian, and Dutch. Prior Anglophone scholarship has al-
most entirely missed war manifestos. This gap in the literature has produced a cor-
respondingly large gap in our understanding of the role of war during the period in 
which manifestos were commonly used. Examining these previously ignored mani-
festos reveals that states exercised the right to wage war in ways that would be in-
conceivable today. In short, the right to intervene militarily could be asserted in any 
situation in which a legal right had been violated and all peaceful channels had 
been explored and exhausted. This Article begins by describing war manifestos. It 
then explores their history and evolution over the course of five centuries, explains 
the purposes they served for sovereigns, shows the many “just causes” they cited for 
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war, and, finally, considers the lessons they hold for modern legal dilemmas. The 
discovery of war manifestos as a set of legal documents not only offers lawyers and 
legal scholars a new window into the international legal universe of the past, but it 
also casts new light on several long-standing legal debates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The UN Charter provides that states are prohibited from the 
“threat or use of force” against other sovereign states.1 There are 
only three exceptions: (1) member states may defend themselves 
or others from “armed attack”;2 (2) states may use force if the UN 
Security Council issues a resolution permitting it (a resolution 
that any of the five permanent members may veto);3 and (3) states 
may use force inside another state with its free consent.4 All other 
uses of military force, or threats thereof, are illegal.5 
But this has not always been true. 
For centuries, states lawfully waged war for many reasons 
that today would appear absurd. States fought wars to collect 
debts, to recover tort damages, to protect trading rights, and to 
enforce treaty obligations, among other reasons. Indeed, for cen-
turies, states could wage war not only in self-defense, but also in 
response to a violation of any right whatsoever: if a state had a 
 
 1 UN Charter Art 1. 
 2 UN Charter Art 51. 
 3 See UN Charter Arts 27, 42. 
 4 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN General Assembly, 
53d Sess (Jan 28, 2002), UN Doc A/Res/56/83 5 (“Valid consent by a State to the commis-
sion of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to 
the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”). 
 5 To be sure, some disagree about when these conditions authorize force. For exam-
ple, there is substantial disagreement about the scope of the self-defense exception. See 
Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate 
Actors, 106 Am J Intl L 770 (2012) (offering an account of the scope of a state’s right of 
self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors); Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst and Michael Wood, Self-Defense against Nonstate Actors: Reflections on the 
“Bethlehem Principles”, 107 Am J Intl L 390 (2013) (critiquing Bethlehem’s argument). 
Moreover, there is substantial disagreement over whether there is an exception to the 
Charter for humanitarian intervention. See Oona A. Hathaway, et al, Consent-Based Hu-
manitarian Intervention: Giving Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 Cornell 
Intl L J 499, 519–38 (2013) (summarizing diverse scholarly views on humanitarian inter-
vention). Despite these disagreements, there is a strong consensus on one important point: 
the right to war—the jus ad bellum—is tightly constrained. 
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cause of action, but there was no court that had jurisdiction over 
the case, a state could go to war as a last resort. 
The right of states to wage war as a last resort was put suc-
cinctly by Hugo Grotius: “Where judicial settlement fails, war be-
gins.”6 States are legally permitted to go to war, Grotius main-
tained, because, in the absence of a court with the power to give 
them relief, they have no other option. Indeed, he explained that 
the casus belli—the justified causes of war—are nothing more 
than garden-variety causes of action: “It is evident that the 
sources from which wars arise are as numerous as those from 
which lawsuits spring.”7 
This Article shows that the nearly unlimited right to wage 
war to right wrongs was not merely set out in international law 
treatises, but states also acted on it. (And, indeed, the practice 
predated the treatises.) We lay out our evidence for this surpris-
ing claim by examining “war manifestos,” documents that set out 
the legal reasons sovereigns provided for going to war. For the 
purposes of this Article, we have assembled the world’s largest 
collection of war manifestos—over 350—in languages as diverse 
as Classical Chinese, German, French, Latin, Serbo-Croatian, 
and Dutch. The earliest manifesto in the collection dates to 1492 
and the most recent to 1945.8 These manifestos offer a fascinating 
 
 6 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace: Three Books 2.1.2.1 at 171 (Clarendon 
Press 1925) (Francis W. Kelsey, trans). For other classical discussions of when war is just, 
see Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty 31–85 (Clarendon Press 
1950) (Gwladys L. Williams, trans); Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law: With 
a Sketch of the History of the Science 4.1.1–9 at 209–18 (Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1836); 
Georg Friedrich von Martens, Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties 
and Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe 8.2.3 at 273–74 (Thomas Bradford 1795) 
(William Cobbett, trans); Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the 
Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns 3.3.26 at 302 
(P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1758) (Joseph Chitty, trans); Samuel von Pufendorf, On the 
Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books 8.6.3 at 226 (Lichfield 1703) (Basil Kennett, 
trans). In this respect, classical international lawyers were simply following the just war 
tradition. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II.40.1 at 926–27 (Studii Generalis 
1941); Augustine, Quaestionum in Heptateuchum Libri Septem 6.10; Cicero, De re Publica, de 
Legibus 3.35 at 213–14 (Putnam 1928) (Clinton Walker Keyes, trans); Francisci de Victoria, 
De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones 410–23 (Carnegie Institute 1917) (Ernest Nys, ed); 
R.P. Francisco Suarez, 12 Opera Omina Tractatus III, Disputatio XIII 4.1; Isadore of Seville, 
Etymologiarum XVIII.1. 
 7 Grotius, Law of War and Peace 2.1.2.1 at 171 (cited in note 6). The common ele-
ment of causes of action and causes of war is a possible or actual wrong: “Actions, further-
more, lie either for wrongs not yet committed, or for wrongs already done.” Id. See also id 
2.1.2.2 at 172. 
 8 The collection begins at 1492 because this document represents the oldest mani-
festo we located. It ends, however, at 1945 because the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, reaf-
firmed after the end of World War II, reconstructed the legal architecture by which states 
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window into the legal practice of warfare. They show that states 
exercised the right to wage war in a way that would be inconceiv-
able today. The right to intervene militarily could be asserted in 
any situation in which a legal right had been violated and all 
peaceful channels had been explored and exhausted. 
Prior legal scholarship has almost entirely missed war mani-
festos. Indeed, Anglophone scholarship as a whole has largely ig-
nored them.9 The only two significant studies of war manifestos 
are by German historians and are available only in German.10 
There are a variety of reasons for the limited scholarship on mani-
festos, despite their importance. First and foremost, war manifes-
tos have not been issued for more than seven decades. Once com-
mon, they are now forgotten. Second, in part because they are so 
old, manifestos are often very difficult to locate. They are spread 
across rare book libraries throughout the world. Only recently 
have a number of them been digitized and made available online. 
Even then, only a small number can be found in this way. Third, 
the manifestos are in many different languages, and the oldest 
can be difficult to read, even for native speakers of the correspond-
ing modern languages. It took four years to assemble the collec-
tion of manifestos on which this Article relies, and it required the 
collective expertise of more than twenty research assistants with 
 
could go to war. After 1945, states could not wage “just war” simply by articulating reasons 
via manifesto. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, 46 Stat 2343, TIAS No 796 (1928) (providing that 
parties “renounce” war as a solution for any “disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or 
whatever origin they may be”). Therefore, though some documents can be located after 
1945 that meet our four criteria for manifestos, they are few and far between, and they do 
not serve the same legal function as they would have when unilateral wars were permit-
ted. We do, however, still see vestiges of war manifestos in the modern era. For more, see 
Part II.D. 
 9 A notable exception is James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Vic-
tory and the Making of Modern War 125–31 (Harvard 2012), from which we first learned 
about the existence of war manifestos. See also Randall Lesaffer, Defensive Warfare, Pre-
vention and Hegemony. The Justifications for the Franco-Spanish War of 1635 (Part I), 8 
J Hist Intl L 91, 95 (2006) (discussing a French manifesto justifying the 1635 war with 
Spain); Pärtel Piirimäe, Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish 
Intervention in the Thirty Years War, 45 Hist J 499 (2002) (discussing a Swedish manifesto 
justifying intervention in the Thirty Years War). 
 10 See generally Anuschka Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen in der Frühen 
Neuzeit: Herrscherkommunikation in Europa zwischen Souveränität und Korporativem 
Selbstverständnis (LIT 2012). Professor Anuschka Tischer drew upon Konrad Repgen, 
Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa: Entwurf einer Historischen Typologie 5–27 (Stiftung 
Historisches Kolleg 1985). In addition, see generally Bernd Klesmann, Bellum Solemne: 
Formen und Funktionen Europäischer Kriegserklärungen des 17. Jahrhunderts (Philipp 
von Zabern 2007). 
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extraordinarily varied language skills and expertise in reading 
older language forms to code and interpret the manifestos. 
This gap in the literature has produced a correspondingly 
large gap in our understanding of the role of war during the pe-
riod in which manifestos were commonly used. War manifestos, 
after all, were used by sovereigns to justify their resort to arms. 
As King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden began his manifesto de-
fending his entry into the Thirty Years War in 1631, “When we 
come to consider the business of war, the first question to be pro-
posed is, whether it be just or no.”11 Sovereigns were always anx-
ious to explain their decisions to wage war and to show that their 
actions were not examples of mass murder but the exercise of a 
valid legal right. 
By examining these war manifestos, we are able to track the 
kinds of reasons that were commonly accepted for going to war. 
But war manifestos are interesting not only because of their con-
tent, but also for their form. As we will see, war manifestos re-
sembled complaints in lawsuits. Just as a plaintiff sets out his 
causes of action in a document served to a defendant, a war mani-
festo sets out the causes of war so that the enemy can know the 
legal justification of the battles to follow. And just as the defend-
ant responds with an answer to the complaint served, sovereigns 
routinely issued what we call “counter-manifestos”—detailed re-
buttals of a manifesto’s claims with additional causes of action 
often tacked on. 
Manifestos and counter-manifestos appear like legal docu-
ments in litigation because, as our colleague Professor James 
Whitman has recently argued, war was understood to be a form 
of litigation, albeit one in which members of both sides were 
slaughtered.12 States went to war because they had no court in 
which they could state their claims and seek relief. They sought 
to enforce their own rights because they had no other choice. 
 
 11 See Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook 122, 129 (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2010): 
And who is he that will not judge that His Majesty has been really forced against 
his will to undertake this just war and obliged thereto by constraint and urgent 
necessity, after having tried all the ways of right justice and met with all sorts 
of obstructions and hindrances instead of the good and wholesome remedies he 
proposed? 
See also Piirimäe, 45 Hist J at 517–18 (cited in note 9) (arguing that Adolphus’s document 
was not a war manifesto because Adolphus did not characterize the Swedish invasion of 
Pomerania as a war). 
 12 See Whitman, Verdict of Battle at 18 (cited in note 9). 
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It is important to note that the manifesto practice described 
here is a largely, though not exclusively, European practice. The 
theoretical and legal framework on which this practice rested was 
developed by European thinkers.13 As this Article documents, war 
was the core enforcement mechanism of this legal order. The 
highly legalized practice of warmaking was shaped by Europe and 
shaped it in turn. Europe then spread these ideas to the rest of 
the world, usually by force.14 Before Western international law 
arrived in Asia and Africa, the formalized practice of war mani-
festos did not exist. (Sovereigns often did give reasons for waging 
war, though, and many reasons were the same as those developed 
in the European practice. Sovereigns do not exist in a vacuum—
they cannot wage war alone.)15 
This Article begins in Part I by explaining what, precisely, a 
war manifesto is. Because these documents have been almost en-
tirely lost to history, it is necessary to describe their key features. 
A manifesto, as we define it here, must (1) be public, (2) be issued 
by a sovereign, (3) be against another sovereign, and (4) has as its 
function to justify war. These features help us determine not only 
what qualifies as a war manifesto, but also what does not. Private 
letters, documents issued by nonsovereigns, speeches to the pub-
lic,16 declarations of war that contain no justifications—all such 
documents are excluded (even if, as is sometimes the case, they 
contain the word “manifesto”). War manifestos are, in short, legal 
 
 13 For instance, Grotius, still today known as the “father of international law,” was 
Dutch; Balthazar Ayala, Flemish; Emmerich de Vattel, Swiss; Samuel von Pufendorf, Ger-
man; Alberico Gentili, Italian; Francisco de Vitoria, Spanish. 
 14 See Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical 
Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World 131–57 (Simon & Schuster 2017) (describing the 
forceful spread of Western international law into Asia). 
 15 Consider the clarigatio, the Roman practice of demanding restitution before en-
gaging in battle. The ancient practice required a priest to approach the border of any ter-
ritory Rome intended to attack wearing a wool veil, and announce the Roman grievance 
in the presence of three men of military age from the other side: 
When the envoy has arrived at the frontiers of the people from whom satisfaction 
is sought, he covers his head with a bonnet—the covering is of wool—and says: 
“Hear, Jupiter; hear, ye boundaries of”—naming whatever nation they belong 
to;—“let righteousness hear! I am the public herald of the Roman People; I come 
duly and religiously commissioned; let my words be credited,” Then he recites 
his demands. 
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 1.32.6 (Loeb Classical Library 1919) (B.O. Foster, trans). The sen-
ate could authorize war if these demands were ignored. See Alan Watson, International 
Law in Archaic Rome 20–26 (Johns Hopkins 1993). 
 16 A number of the manifestos in our collection were originally delivered as speeches 
to parliamentary bodies but were later published. 
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documents that serve a specific role in the relations between 
equal sovereign states in the definition and resolution of disputes 
(whether through settlement or war). 
Part II then describes the history of war manifestos—their 
origins in the medieval papal and imperial courts, giving way in 
the sixteenth century to an exchange of manifestos between inde-
pendent and equal sovereigns, and finally the expansion and de-
mocratization of manifesto practice as new technologies allowed 
the written word to reach a larger, more literate population. This 
history offers a novel vantage point for viewing the emergence 
and evolution of the sovereign state. Today, many take modern 
state sovereignty for granted. But what we sometimes think of as 
a natural or inevitable phenomenon is an invention of the last five 
centuries. War manifestos allow us to see how independent and 
equal sovereign states interacted with one another at moments of 
friction—when war loomed. This historical narrative—which ex-
tends from the fifteenth to the twentieth century—not only offers 
insight into the evolution of states and the role of war and war 
manifestos in their relations with one another, but, in the process, 
also helps us better understand features of our own legal system, 
which retains some vestiges of these historical practices. 
Part III turns to examining the purposes of manifestos. Why 
did sovereigns expend so much energy on manifestos? Why did 
they bother offering reasons for war to the opposing sovereign and 
to the public at large? One reason is that the law required them 
to do so. But there were other reasons as well. A manifesto could 
help sovereigns avoid war, by allowing settlement of disputes be-
fore states actually resorted to arms. But even if the manifesto 
was not successful in avoiding war, it served important purposes. 
To begin with, it allowed the sovereign to assuage his own con-
science and, indeed, save his soul. At a time when every ruler in 
Europe professed to believe in God, each ruler understood himself 
to be bound to launch only “just wars” and then only as a last 
resort, lest he incur God’s judgment. In addition, manifestos, by 
making the sovereign’s reasons for war public, helped sovereigns 
rally the domestic support and support from allies that were es-
sential to winning a war. 
For the purposes described in Part III to be achieved, how-
ever, the reasons given in manifestos had to be those that were 
considered legitimate—or “just.” Part IV thus turns to an exami-
nation of the reasons that were considered “just.” Our team of re-
search assistants read all the manifestos in the collection and 
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catalogued (or “coded”) the reasons sovereigns gave in them for 
going to war. In Part IV, we describe the most commonly offered 
reasons for war. What we found is surprising: reasons that today 
would be considered absurd justifications for war were, for hun-
dreds of years, considered entirely legitimate. These included pro-
tecting the balance of power, remedying tortious wrongs, collect-
ing debts, protecting trade interests, protecting diplomatic 
relations, humanitarian intervention, religious claims, enforcing 
treaty obligations, enforcing the laws of war, declarations of inde-
pendence, and other causes. 
Finally, in Part V, we turn to the implications of these discov-
eries. In addition to the insights into the emergence and evolution 
of the modern sovereign state and state system described in 
Part II, there are two central lessons to learn from war manifes-
tos. First, the creation of a new database of legal documents opens 
up an entirely new body of materials on which lawyers and schol-
ars may draw. War manifestos give scholars direct access to the 
international legal arguments sovereigns made to one another, 
and therefore to the kinds of legal claims they considered valid. 
That, in turn, casts an entirely new light on several old debates, 
including the intended aims of the Founders in writing the US 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and the long-debated Alien Tort 
Statute17 passed by the First Congress. Second, recent years have 
seen wide-ranging debates over whether the limited set of permis-
sible reasons for war in the UN Charter should be expanded. 
Some argue that there should be a humanitarian intervention ex-
ception; others that Syria’s violation of the ban on chemical weap-
ons authorizes the use of force to enforce the law.18 What we learn 
from examining war manifesto practice is that war used to be con-
sidered legitimate for a wide range of “just” causes. That changed 
with the prohibition on war and, later, the adoption of the UN 
Charter, which prohibits states from making unilateral decisions 
to unleash destructive force for reasons they regard as “just.” 
Calls to open the door to a wider use of war to address legal 
wrongs threaten to return us to a world in which war is 
 
 17 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat 73, 76–77, 28 USC § 1350. 
 18 See Hathaway, et al, 46 Cornell Intl L J at 519–38 (cited in note 5) (describing 
scholarly literature on humanitarian intervention, some of which argues for a humanitar-
ian intervention exception); Harold Koh, Not Illegal: But Now the Hard Part Begins (Just 
Security, Apr 7, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S434-4EDE (arguing that US strikes 
against the Syrian airfield that had launched chemical weapons was not illegal aggression 
in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter). 
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ubiquitous and rights are decided by force—the very world that 
our predecessors struggled long and hard to escape. 
This brings us to the central importance of understanding 
war manifestos: they give us a glimpse into a world that, though 
it may appear alien to us now, laid the foundations of our own. It 
is easy today, more than seven decades after the inauguration of 
the UN Charter, to assume that the current world order is inevi-
table. History teaches us that it is not. At a moment when the 
modern international legal order is at risk—in the wake of the 
first successful conquest in Europe since World War II and a re-
treat from global leadership by the United States—it is worth re-
membering how different the world once looked.19 
I.  WHAT IS A WAR MANIFESTO? 
A war manifesto, as that term is used in this Article, is a very 
specific type of document, one that serves a defined role in the 
relations between equal sovereign states in the resolution of dis-
putes (whether through settlement or war). It therefore does not 
apply to any and all historical documents relating to war. Instead, 
we apply a strict test meant to focus on documents that served 
this specific legal function. A manifesto must be (1) public, (2) is-
sued by a sovereign, (3) against another sovereign, and (4) have 
as its function to justify war. In assembling the dataset on which 
this Article is based, we applied this four-part test. This led us to 
exclude a number of documents that were titled “manifesto” but 
did not meet these characteristics (and to include a number of 
documents that were not labeled “manifestos” but nonetheless 
met the criteria). Documents that met all but one of the four char-
acteristics were classified as “quasi-manifestos.”20 Manifestos 
written in response to another, earlier manifesto were classified 
as “counter-manifestos.” 
Public. Manifestos were meant to be public—not necessarily 
immediately but in the near term. As described at length in 
Part III, manifestos served a persuasive function that made pub-
licity essential. The majority of manifestos in the collection were 
published contemporaneously in small pamphlets by local 
 
 19 See Hathaway and Shapiro, The Internationalists, at 309–35 (cited in note 14) (de-
scribing the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and showing how unusual such a conquest 
is in the modern era). 
 20 We excluded seventy-eight documents from Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegrün-
dungen in der Frühen Neuzeit (cited in note 10), because they did not meet all four criteria. 
Of these, we determined that eighteen were quasi-manifestos. 
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printing houses. Later, they migrated to newspapers. Though 
some are the length of a book, most are brief—only six or seven 
pages. Typically the language is simple and accessible to the pub-
lic. The first page generally contains the title, which is often col-
orful and lengthy. An example appears below: 
FIGURE 1:  1644 WAR MANIFESTO21 
 
 21 A Declaration or Manifesto, Wherein the Roman Imperial Majesty Makes Known 
to the States & Peers of Hungarie, What Reasons and Motives Have Compelled Him to 
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The story told by a manifesto is meant to be compelling to the 
public. Indeed, some of the greatest writers of the time were com-
missioned to write manifestos on behalf of their sovereigns. It is 
almost always clear that the sovereign intends the manifesto to 
be read by the citizenry. The documents sometimes even explicitly 
address the public, arguing that the justness of the cause requires 
civilians to support the war effort. 
Issued by a sovereign. A manifesto is classified as a manifesto 
only if it is issued by a sovereign. It is often obvious at a glance 
that a document is, indeed, an official document of a sovereign. 
Manifestos frequently have a royal crest on the front cover, and 
most begin with a lengthy introduction of the issuing sovereign, 
often including his many titles (for example, “Ferdinand the third 
by the grace of God Elected Roman Emperour of Germanie, Hun-
gary, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia and Sclavonia, King, Arch-
Duke of Austria, Duke of Burgundie, Slyria, Karndten and 
Craine, Marquis of Moravia, Count of Tyroll and Gortz, &c”).22 
Against another sovereign. A manifesto must be directed at 
another sovereign. Not infrequently, a document has the form of 
a manifesto in most respects but is not directed at another sover-
eign—for example, it may be directed at an organized armed 
group or rebellion. That document would be classified in our da-
tabase as a quasi-manifesto. In a true manifesto, after the open-
ing identifying the issuing authority, the manifesto usually then 
turns to the sovereign target. Often this begins with a recounting 
of the course of relations between the two states (with these 
 
Proceed in Open Warre against the Prince of Transylvania (Feb 23, 1644), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q679-X6QR. 
 22 Id at 1. Sovereigns did not actually write the manifestos; they were written on a 
sovereign’s behalf. For example, Baron Stackelberg wrote a manifesto against Poland in 
1772 on behalf of Catherine the Great of Russia, setting forth Catherine’s views on the 
First Partition of Poland. Declaration in the Name of Tsar Catherine II on the Establish-
ment of the First Polish Division, in Gazette d’Utrecht (1772), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C6WM-NF2F. See also Estienne Guillaume Du Bellay, ed, To the 
Reichsstaende directed writing to defend the position of Franz I of France (1537), in Exem-
plaria Literarum Quibus et Christianissimus Galliarum Rex Fraciscus (Rob. Stephani 
1537), archived at http://perma.cc/W887-DSQD (letter manifesto on the Italian War of 
1536–1538, written on behalf of Francis I, likely by an ambassador in his official capacity). 
On occasion, rebel groups would issue documents that look much like manifestos, perhaps 
in part as a bid to establish sovereignty by engaging in sovereign practices. See, for exam-
ple, Manifesto of the Congress of the Confederate States of America Relative to the Existing 
War with the United States (June 14, 1864), in The Statutes at Large of the Confederate 
States of America, Passed at the First Session of the Second Congress; 1864 286–88 (R.M. 
Smith 1864) (James M. Matthews, ed), archived at http://perma.cc/4ANZ-2VEM. 
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relations often framed as having been positive before the change 
of events giving rise to the manifesto). 
We limit our definition of manifestos to documents issued by 
a sovereign against another sovereign not only for practical rea-
sons—private documents justifying war are legion, and analyzing 
them would be intractable—but for conceptual reasons as well. 
Our study focuses on a limited subset of wars, namely those be-
tween sovereigns, which international lawyers used to call “public 
wars” and now call “international armed conflicts.” Because we 
focus on wars between sovereigns, we concentrate on the justifi-
cations offered on behalf of those sovereigns in their conflicts with 
one another. Reprising our lawsuit analogy, we study legal claims 
made by sovereigns against other sovereigns because they are the 
“parties” to the dispute.23 
Have as its function to justify war. A manifesto’s purpose is 
to document the reasons that justify the war—the “just causes.” 
The law at the time manifestos were common required sovereigns 
to have a just cause for war; the central legal function of the man-
ifesto was to satisfy this legal condition and, moreover, to make 
clear to all observers that the legal obligation had been satisfied 
(hence the first criterion—the document must be public). Most 
manifestos do not give only one reason for war; they generally 
give several, and the explanations can stretch on for pages. The 
sovereign issuing the manifesto generally explains that he has 
attempted to negotiate with the other side or remedy the situation 
through diplomatic means. Because those efforts have not yielded 
the desired results, the sovereign concludes, he has no choice but 
to go to war. (Here, the issuing sovereign is following the dictates 
of international law—war was permitted, but only as a last re-
sort.) 
According to our definition, a document is a manifesto only if 
its function is to set out the reasons justifying war. Other docu-
ments set out these reasons, though doing so was not their func-
tion. For example, declarations of war often mentioned the legal 
causes of war. Indeed, many declarations were published in the 
 
 23 A follow-on project to ours could examine quasi-manifestos issued by or against 
nonsovereign entities to see if they are different in any systematic ways from those issued 
by sovereigns. We therefore include them in the public war manifesto database. See Oona 
A. Hathaway, et al, War Manifestos Database (2017), online at http://documents.law.yale 
.edu/manifestos (visited Feb 19, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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same pamphlets as the manifestos.24 But the function of a decla-
ration of war was to declare war, not to justify it. These docu-
ments are generally much shorter than manifestos, usually a few 
paragraphs in length, and if they contain the purported just 
causes of war, they are usually stated in a conclusory fashion ra-
ther than established with supporting facts and arguments. 
These four criteria define the documents that qualify as war 
manifestos. But even though all manifestos from 1492 to 1945 
met these four criteria, manifestos were not static over the course 
of the centuries during which they were commonly used. They 
emerged out of the practice of a theoretically unified medieval or-
der, became a mechanism for independent and formally equal 
sovereigns to express their claims to one another, and increas-
ingly became a tool for the sovereign to communicate with his own 
population. To see how the practice emerged and changed, we 
turn next to the history of war manifestos. 
II.  HISTORY OF MANIFESTOS 
To understand the role of manifestos in shaping state behav-
ior over the course of centuries, we start by tracing the history of 
their use. The practice of using war manifestos did not emerge out 
of thin air. Instead, war manifestos arose from an earlier practice: 
during the medieval period, European rulers appeared before 
their feudal superiors or the pope to address wrongs done to them 
by their fellow rulers in a practice that is intriguingly reminiscent 
of modern-day pleadings before a court.25 After the collapse of pa-
pal authority and feudal allegiances, the practice of persuasion 
through written submissions of wrongs done to the petitioner con-
tinued, but the community of sovereigns, not a single superior, 
was now the primary audience. The evolution of manifestos over 
the course of centuries reflects technological innovations in mass 
communication, as well as emerging changes in the relationship 
 
 24 See generally, for example, The King of France’s Declaration of War against Spain, 
Dated January 9, N.S., with a Manifesto, Containing the Reasons; and a Postscript of an 
Intercepted Letter from Cardinal Alberoni to the Prince de Cellamare (A. Bell 1719) (con-
taining a declaration of war, accompanied by a manifesto giving the reasons for the war), 
archived at http://perma.cc/79JJ-QLKY. The version of the manifesto that was coded as 
part of the database is in the original French, Manifeste sur les Sujets de Rupture entre la 
France et l’Espagne (Vaultier 1719), http://perma.cc/E3K5-U4G2. The French version, 
however, was not accompanied by the declaration. 
 25 Manifestos mirror modern-day pleadings in a number of ways, including some of 
their pathologies: for example, they might make unsubstantiated factual claims or engage 
in artful pleading, over pleading, forum pleading, and notice pleading. 
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between the sovereign leader and the governed. As absolute mon-
archy gave way in many places to democracy, war manifestos re-
flected the shifting center of power. The history of war manifestos, 
then, tells not only the history of war but also the history of the 
international legal order and, indeed, the history of the emer-
gence and evolution of the modern sovereign state itself. 
A. Pre-manifesto Practice: Hierarchy and the Papal Court 
During the medieval period, states as we know them today 
had not yet taken shape. The European world constituted an elabo-
rate and highly ordered hierarchical system within which every par-
ticipant, whether prince or peasant, had an assigned role.26 From 
the medieval point of view, the different nations of Christendom 
constituted a single entity, the respublica Christiana,27 and so all 
conflicts between Christian princes were internal affairs that had 
to be resolved according to a system that recognized the mutual 
dependence and common allegiance of the participants. 
This conception of Europe as a unified body led to the practice 
whereby disputants, before going to war, placed their dispute be-
fore their common superior. Local barons went before their com-
mon king, or minor kings within the Holy Roman Empire might 
present their cases before the emperor.28 This process of appeal 
gave the parties a chance to have their cases reviewed by a neu-
tral third party, who could verify that the proposed war was legal 
and founded on reasonable grounds, and who, most importantly, 
could attempt to resolve the disagreement peaceably. 
This system made sense for rulers who acknowledged a com-
mon feudal superior, but created difficulties when conflicts arose 
between those great rulers who did not acknowledge a temporal 
superior, including the kings of France and England, who consid-
ered themselves to be “emperors in their own realms.”29 The medi-
eval world order, however, recognized a higher authority to whom 
 
 26 See Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes: Constitutional History 
and the Symbolic Language of the Holy Roman Empire 80 (Berghahn 2015) (Thomas Dun-
lap, trans) (“[The emperor and the pope] infused the entire order hierarchically from top 
to bottom.”). 
 27 See J. Neville Figgis, Respublica Christiana, 5 Transactions of the Royal Hist Soc 
63, 70–71 (1911). 
 28 For a description of the procedure in medieval France, see, 12 Ordonnances des 
Rois de France de la Troisième Race 414 (De L’Imprimerie Royale 1777), online at 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k108682r/f453.image (visited Feb 16, 2018) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable). 
 29 See Figgis, 5 Transactions of the Royal Hist Soc at 73 (cited in note 27). 
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such rulers could appeal: the pope. After all, “[i]f a king made war 
on the Emperor, or the Emperor on a king not subject to him, no 
one except the Pope could be referred to as the common lord of 
both.”30 In such situations, rulers had recourse to the papal court: 
“‘The individual princes and kings have their particular domains; 
Peter is above all. . . .’ The pope is Lord and Master of all things, 
. . . judge over rulers and lord of the whole world.”31 
This accountability to the pope did not prevent medieval rul-
ers from going to war, but it shaped the way they did so in highly 
important ways.32 First, sovereigns were required to present their 
arguments for war in a legal context, outlining their reasons in a 
manner suitable for the papal court and its sophisticated lawyers. 
Second, this process shaped the reasons themselves, encouraging 
rulers to conform their arguments to the norms contained in 
canon law, so as to secure papal approbation or at least avoid pa-
pal censure. Finally, the process forced rulers to go through a se-
ries of legal procedures before they could resolve their disputes on 
 
 30 Bede Jarrett, Social Theories of the Middle Ages 191 (Newman 1942) (quoting 
Antoninus of Florence). 
 31 Johannes Haller, Lord of the World, in James M. Powell, ed, Innocent III: Vicar of 
Christ or Lord of the World? 47–48 (DC Heath 1963). Here, of course, it must be noted that 
the degree to which medieval popes actually exercised the power that they claimed re-
mains a matter of dispute among scholars. See generally, for example, Walter Ullmann, 
The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relation 
of Clerical to Lay Power (Methuen 1955), and other works by the same author for a strong 
interpretation of papal authority in the Middle Ages. For a more limited view of the papal 
role as arbiter of the international order, see Wilhelm G. Grewe, 3 The Epochs of Interna-
tional Law 93–94 (Walter de Gruyter 2000) (Michael Byers, trans). In many ways the 
modern debate is only a continuation of the medieval debate between advocates of papal 
power, often called in the literature hierocrats, who at their most extreme argued that the 
pope had universal, direct, and unlimited jurisdiction over the entire globe and every per-
son who inhabited it, and the advocates of imperial power, sometimes called dualists. It is 
important to remember, however, that even the so-called dualists recognized the spiritual 
supremacy of the pope, as well as his right to intervene in temporal affairs under certain 
carefully circumscribed conditions. For a discussion of the distinction between hierocrats 
and dualists, as well as the limitations inherent in imposing this modern analytical frame-
work on the complex world of medieval European politics, see Joseph Canning, A History 
of Medieval Political Thought: 300–1450 93–95 (Routledge 1996). 
 32 Professor Tischer asserts that, even in medieval times, papal legitimation was lit-
tle more than a fig leaf. See Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen at 52 (cited in note 10), 
discussing Christoph Kampmann, Arbiter und Friedensstiftung: Die Auseinandersetzung 
um den Politischen Schiedsrichter im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit 21, 31–36 (Ferdinand 
Schöningh 2001). This is a matter of scholarly dispute. See note 31. For reasons explained 
here, the justification process is important regardless of whether it was effective at pre-
venting armed conflicts. 
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the battlefield, helping to ensure that war really was the last re-
sort and not entered into precipitously.33 
The Hundred Years’ War offers an example of how the pro-
cess worked: before declaring war against Philip VI, Edward III 
notified the pope that he intended to claim the French crown for 
himself. Edward’s right to the crown was highly dubious because 
it came through his mother, and under the Salic law women could 
not inherit. The pope attempted to dissuade Edward from making 
such a rash claim, but when Edward would not yield, he com-
manded Edward and Philip to send their envoys to Avignon to 
present their cases before him.34 In Avignon, Edward’s ambassa-
dors presented the brief for his “case in equity” before the pope, 
stating the reasons by which Edward believed that he was justi-
fied in claiming the French crown and the sort of relief he 
sought.35 The pope heard the complaint and attempted, unsuc-
cessfully, to bring the two kings to settle their dispute.36 As was 
often the case, the pope served as a kind of referee, ensuring that 
all parties followed the rules of the game and penalizing those 
parties who failed to comply.37 However, he could not prevent 
them from going to war or compel them to accept his proposed so-
lution to their dispute. This appeals process, consequently, is best 
understood not as an alternative to war but rather as a final pro-
cedural step in the process of attempting to resolve conflicts prior 
 
 33 For example, in 1340, at the dawn of the Hundred Years’ War, Edward III of Eng-
land began his letter of defiance to Philip VI of France, 
Philip of Valois, we have long laboured with you by embassages and all other 
reasonable ways, to the end that you should restore unto us our rightful inher-
itance of France . . . and forsomuch as we well perceive that you intend to perse-
vere in the same injurious usurpation, without returning any satisfactory an-
swer to our just demand, we have entered the land of Flanders. 
The Letter of the King of England to Philip de Valois, the French King, Going to the Siege 
of Tournay (July 27, 1340), in John Foxe, 2 The Acts and Monuments, 1516–1587, 677 
(Religious Tract Society 1887). Edward thus demonstrated that he had complied with the 
legal requirement to exhaust every possible alternative for resolving the dispute. 
 34 From 1309 to 1377 the papacy was headquartered in the French city of Avignon 
rather than in Rome. 
 35 See Libellus de Eduardi Causae Aequitatae Papae, in 25 Cesare Baronio, Annales 
Ecclesiastici 202–03 (Silvestri 1872). 
 36 Id at 204. 
 37 See, for example, Georges Daumet, Benoit XII (1334–1342): Lettres Closes, Pa-
tentes et Curiales se Rapportant à la France XXXVII–XLIII (E. de Boccard 1920). Daumet 
gives a fascinating account of a time when the pope disciplined the king of France and 
forced him to back down over an incident involving a breach of the customary rights of 
ambassadors. 
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to war. Rulers might manage to resolve their disputes peaceably at 
this stage, but there was no guarantee that they would do so. 
The reasons developed by rulers for presentation to the pope 
were not delivered only in the curial setting. Rulers would go to 
great lengths to make them public as well. Medieval rulers de-
pended on the support of their populations just as do modern gov-
ernments—perhaps more so, given the relative weakness of cen-
tral rulers in the feudal context—and their vassals would not go 
to war without any explanation. Furthermore, rulers hoped to 
minimize opposition and so attempted to persuade at least some 
portion of the enemy’s subjects that their cause was just. There-
fore, rulers issued explanations of their actions to their own sub-
jects and to those of their opponents, explaining why they had to 
go to war. 
The Hundred Years’ War is again illustrative. Before formally 
declaring war on Philip, Edward drew up an explanatory letter 
addressed to the “Nobles and Commons of France.” In this letter, 
Edward explained that Philip had refused all his overtures of 
peace, and that, therefore, he was “forced of necessity” to go to 
war, both for “the recovery of [his subjects’] rights” and for the 
“safeguard and profit” of his French subjects.38 He guaranteed the 
safety and protection of those French subjects who were loyal to 
him, and “forasmuch as the premises cannot easily be intimated 
to all and singular persons, [he] provided the same to be fixed 
upon church doors, and other public places, whereby the manifest 
notice thereof may come to all men.”39 Therefore, even before the 
printing press had made mass distribution of war manifestos con-
venient, rulers took pains to ensure that the populace had access 
to their reasons for war. 
The medieval era thus set the stage for later war manifesto 
practice and helps us better understand its legal character. Dec-
larations of war—which in the medieval period took the form of 
so-called “letters of defiance”—inaugurated wars and gave rulers 
an opportunity to state their reasons for war to their enemies. 
Rulers also offered public explanations of their conduct in letters 
addressed to the general population and posted in public places. 
The medieval appeals to feudal superiors and the pope gave the 
affair the tenor of a formal judicial proceeding, with kings care-
fully outlining their legal reasons for taking up arms. That 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id at 674–75. 
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formalistic legal process mirroring a courtroom trial would con-
tinue even after papal authority declined in the sixteenth cen-
tury, as technological and political developments facilitated the 
merger of these complaints with letters of defiance and public ex-
planations to create the war manifesto. 
B. Early Modern European Manifestos: The Rise of the 
Sovereign State 
The religious revolution and nationalistic upheaval of the 
early sixteenth century marked the transition from the medieval 
era to the modern age. Many of the key features of manifesto prac-
tice crystallized during that period. 
The beginning of the sixteenth century was a time of transi-
tion in the international order. The late medieval period brought 
the genesis of the modern state. Increasing centralization of 
power in the hands of national sovereigns resulted in the gradual 
demise of private wars, as these sovereigns required their nobles 
to bring disputes before the royal courts rather than settling them 
by force of arms.40 Outside the Holy Roman Empire, legal wars 
took place only between those rulers who acknowledged no com-
mon temporal superior, effectively leaving the pope as the only 
figure who could serve as an arbiter of international law.41 During 
the sixteenth century, however, Protestant rejection of the pope 
and his authority,42 together with the consequent fracturing of 
 
 40 This process was incredibly protracted. In France, for instance, Charles VI prohib-
ited the waging of private wars in 1413, but nobles continued to engage in such conflicts 
until the late seventeenth century, when Louis XI finally succeeded in putting an end to 
the practice. See William Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V 
535–36 (Harper & Brothers 1836); Whitman, Verdict of Battle at 144 (cited in note 9). 
 41 By the end of the medieval period, papal pretensions to supreme authority over 
the international system had grown so exalted that, in 1493, Pope Alexander VI could 
claim to divide the non-Christian world between Spain and Portugal. See Pope Alexander VI, 
Inter Caetera (1493). 
 42 In the early sixteenth century, imperial theorists began to revive the centuries-old 
debate over the relative supremacy of the pope and the emperor. As had earlier medieval 
imperialists—such as, notably, Dante Alighieri—they advocated imperial supremacy in 
temporal affairs and the restriction, though not the abolition, of papal rights in that re-
gard. See, for example, Lupold of Bebenburg, Tractatus de Juribus Regni et Imperii Ro-
manorum (Adriani Wyngaerden 1664), archived at http://perma.cc/P43A-MKYA. Although 
the Protestant Reformation began as an attack on abuses connected with the selling of 
indulgences, it quickly expanded into a more general assault on both the temporal and 
spiritual authority of the papacy and on the role of the medieval church in society. A sem-
inal figure in the Reformation, Martin Luther, argued for the subordination of the Church 
to the temporal authorities. His argument extended to the role of the pope in international 
law. “They say,” he wrote, “[the Pope] is the ruler of the world. This is false; for Christ, 
whose vice-gerent and vicar he claims to be, said to Pilate: ‘My kingdom is not of this 
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Christendom into warring camps, effectively abolished the medi-
eval system and unleashed the chaos and devastation that would 
lead to the establishment of the Westphalian international order 
in the seventeenth century. 
The transformation in the nature of sovereign authority in 
Europe can be seen in the emergence of war manifestos. The very 
first manifesto in our collection, issued by Maximilian in 1492, 
illustrates the emerging practice.43 Maximilian was furious be-
cause Charles had invaded Brittany and demanded that Anne, 
the Duchess of Brittany, marry him. Anne, however, was already 
married to Maximilian. Under compulsion, she renounced her 
marriage and married Charles. Maximillian went to war over the 
act of wife stealing, but not before issuing a manifesto against 
Charles that reflected his rage, asserting that the French king 
“surpasses the name of the fornicator and of the rapist and of the 
adulterer.”44 
Of course, the transition was not immediate. Many rulers 
continued to act as they had before, issuing letters of defiance and 
appealing to the pope.45 They continued, as well, to speak as 
 
world.’” Martin Luther, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Respecting the 
Reformation of the Christian Estate, in Henry Wace and Carl Adolf Buchheim, eds, First 
Principles of the Reformation 32 (John Murray 1883). Though the Protestants differed sig-
nificantly among themselves on questions of theology, ecclesiastical polity, and liturgical 
practice, they nonetheless agreed in asserting the independence of Christian princes vis-
à-vis the supreme pontiff. 
 43 On its face, the document is not issued by the sovereign but is instead addressed 
to the sovereign by his loyal subjects, raising questions about whether it is properly clas-
sified as a manifesto. Context clues in the document and in historical research indicate 
that Maximilian was, in fact, the author of the manifesto. Historical evidence indicates 
that Maximilian was an innovative user of the printing press for political purposes. Using 
the printing press to create a document filled with glowing praise of the sovereign—but 
not explicitly written by the sovereign—is consonant with other political choices Maximil-
ian made. Tischer, likewise, believes that Maximilian was the author of this document 
(and similarly labels it a manifesto). See Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen (cited in 
note 10). 
 44 Contra Falsas Francorum Litteras 1491 Datas, Pro Defensione Honoris Serenis-
simi Romanorum Regis, Semper Augusti (1492). 
 45 See, for example, Manifeste du Duc de Savoye (1613), online at http://cdm15999 
.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/FrenchPolPa/id/32086 (visited Feb 16, 2018) 
(Perma archive unavailable); La Response du Roy de France, Faicte a Nostre S. Pere, Sur 
le Propos Tenu par Lempereur a Sa Sainctete (May 11, 1536), in Recueil d’aucunes lectres 
et Escriptures (1536), archived at http://perma.cc/4X8Y-ZWUV; La replique faicte par Lem-
pereur sur la dicte response, du Roy de France (May 19, 1536), in Recueil d’aucunes lectres 
et Escriptures (1536), archived at http://perma.cc/4X8Y-ZWUV. This latter manifesto—a 
very late example of an appeal to the pope—is exaggerated in its rhetoric, and was seen 
by its contemporaries as faintly ridiculous, indicating that its approach already did not 
reflect the norms of the period in which it was written. Even so, it appears that Catholic 
sovereigns continued the practice of issuing separate manifestos to the pope for some time. 
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though they were part of a common order, citing, for example, the 
defense of Christendom as a justification for war.46 But there were 
important shifts. 
Protestants, who refused to recognize the authority of the 
pope, did not present their cases before him.47 They nonetheless 
still felt a need to present their legal basis for going to war. Some 
of them initially appealed to the Holy Roman emperor instead of 
the pope.48 By the end of the century, however, sovereigns custom-
arily appealed to the Christian community as a whole. For exam-
ple, in 1587, Henry III of Navarre (later Henry IV of France) is-
sued his manifesto against the Catholic faction in France—and 
the pope, whom he labeled the Antichrist and the “firstborn of 
Satan”—in the form of an address to the emperor, all kings and 
republics, the nobility and people of France, and all Christians 
everywhere.49 He rejected the authority of the pope, whom he ac-
cused of meddling in the internal affairs of Christian realms, but 
he called for submitting the disputes roiling Christendom to a 
“free and legitimate Council.”50 
 
The last such example in our collection was issued by Louis XIV of France in 1704, but it 
seems at that stage to have been more of a courtesy and a formality, with no further ex-
pectations than the pope’s neutrality in the temporal realm and his fatherly intercession 
in the spiritual. See Lettre du Roy au Pape contenant les Motifs de la Guerre de Savoye 
(Jan 14, 1704), archived at http://perma.cc/GE5Q-Q3KL. 
 46 Tischer emphasizes that from the collapse of the papal authority through the 
French Revolution (the period of her study), justifications for war were motivated by Eu-
ropean sovereigns’ shared understanding that they were a part of a common Christian 
order in which rulers needed to justify their wars to one another. Tischer, Offizielle 
Kriegsbegründungen at 58, 219 (cited in note 10). 
 47 The Holy Roman Empire had its own procedures for such declarations, which the 
German princes continued to follow. 
 48 See, for example, Declaration du Faict de la Guerre de France (1563), online at 
http://polona.pl/item/declaration-dv-faict-de-la-gverre-de-france-que-les-ambassadeurs-de 
-monseigneur-le,NzkxNDY4Nw/0/#info:metadata (visited Feb 16, 2018) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 49 Declaratio Causarum, Quibus Serenissimus Rex Navarrae, Primus Regii Franco-
rum Sanguinis Princeps, Eiusdemque Regni Heres &c. Externum Militem Conscribere 
Coactus Est 4 (1587), archived at http://perma.cc/T65S-WZSW. 
 50 Id at 5. Henry’s manifesto demonstrates a shift in the conception of how Christen-
dom ought to be governed. Because the papacy itself was the point of contention, and an 
ecumenical council that would be acceptable to all sides remained but a dream, in the 
interim it fell to the collection of Christian sovereigns to cooperate in order to preserve the 
peace and good order of Christendom. In fact, Henry apparently held onto this idea even 
after his 1593 conversion to Roman Catholicism and ascension to the throne of France. In 
1633, the Duke of Sully published a “Grand Design” for the unification of Europe that he 
said had originated with his master, Henry, though the duke himself is thought to have 
been instrumental in its development. The Grand Design envisioned Europe as a federa-
tion of nation-states, overseen by a council representing all the sovereigns. The pope him-
self would occupy first place and preside over the council. Both Elizabeth I of England and 
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The transformation in the nature of the state is thus in-
scribed in early war manifestos. Sovereigns, who once appealed 
to their common superior, and, failing that, to the pope, increas-
ingly addressed their justifications for war instead to their fellow 
Christian rulers. The war manifestos of early modern Europe bor-
rowed many elements of the medieval practice but adapted it to 
the changed conditions of the era. By the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, then, we see the regular issuance of war manifestos in their 
fully developed form, as appeals not for the intervention of a par-
ticular emperor or pope, but as appeals to all—independent and 
formally equal—Christian sovereigns. In later centuries, this 
practice developed further into appeals to all nations of the world 
and all of humanity. 
We thus witness the birth of so-called “Westphalian” sover-
eignty in the transition from letters of defiance, coupled with ap-
peals to higher authority, to war manifestos. Nations increasingly 
refused to acknowledge any superior save God and the law of na-
tions, which had its origin not in the edicts of a single supreme 
lawgiver, nor even necessarily in divine law, but in the collective 
customs and practices of the sovereigns themselves. Indeed, war 
manifestos received formal legal sanction at Westphalia in 1648. 
The Treaty of Westphalia declared, in part, that those who would 
go to war must make “a lawful Cognizance of the Cause” and pur-
sue “the ordinary Course of Justice.” In particular, it stipulated 
that each party was obliged to maintain the peace against anyone 
who would violate it, and that even if such violation were to occur, 
“the Offended shall before all things exhort the Offender not to 
come to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to a friendly Compo-
sition, or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice.”51 It continued: 
[Only] if for the space of three years the Difference cannot be 
terminated by any of those means, all and every one of those 
concern’d in this Transaction shall be oblig’d to join the in-
jur’d Party, and assist him with Counsel and Force to repel 
the Injury, being first advertis’d by the injur’d that gentle 
Means and Justice prevail’d nothing.52 
 
the pope apparently gave some support to the idea, but the principals died before it could 
be brought into effect. See generally Maximilien de Béthune duc de Sully, Grand Design 
of Henry IV (Sweet & Maxwell 1921) (David Ogg, ed). 
 51 Treaty of Westphalia Art 123 (1648). 
 52 Treaty of Westphalia Art 124 (1648). 
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Beneath the formal language was a key point: states were 
obliged to state their claims, and they could go to war to obtain jus-
tice if those claims were not satisfied. The war manifesto—and the 
independent, legally equal, sovereign state—had come into its own. 
C. The Modern Manifesto: Expansion and Democratization 
The demise of papal authority led sovereigns to shift their fo-
cus from persuading the pope to a new audience: their fellow sov-
ereigns and, increasingly, their populations. War manifestos dur-
ing this period tell a story of growing access to the printed word 
and, with it, expanded efforts by sovereigns to reach and persuade 
their populations as a whole. 
Even during the medieval period, sovereigns publicized their 
grievances beyond the papal court. The reasons for war were 
spread by heralds, who would deliver handwritten manifestos, 
read them aloud, and affix them to a public place. At a time when 
few were literate and means of spreading the written word was 
limited, this was the most effective means of communicating to 
the population at large.53 The technology for reaching the public 
began to improve in the fifteenth century. The printing press, in-
vented in 1440 by Johannes Gutenberg, allowed the low-cost re-
production of the printed word and ushered in a democratization 
of access to sovereigns’ war manifestos. As that technology spread 
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, manifestos 
were disseminated more broadly. 
The printing press’s revolutionary impact is well docu-
mented.54 Some twenty million books were printed during the fif-
teenth century.55 The printing press facilitated book dissemina-
tion, spurring dramatic increases in readership and literacy rates 
across Europe.56 While some 77 percent of books printed before 
 
 53 Literacy rates in Europe at the time were below 20 percent. See Max Roser and 
Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Literacy (Our World in Data, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
EWM9-NGNQ. 
 54 See generally, for example, Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, The Coming of 
the Book: The Impact of Printing, 1450–1800 (Verso 2010) (David Gerard, trans). See also 
Elizabeth C. Hanson, The Information Revolution and World Politics 14–17 (Rowman & 
Littlefield 2008); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism 38–39 (Verso 1983); Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen at 
33, 108 (cited in note 10). 
 55 See Febvre and Martin, Coming of the Book at 248 (cited in note 54). There were 
377 catalogued private libraries in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See id at 263. 
 56 See, for example, Tatiana Schlossberg, The State of Publishing: Literacy Rates 
(McSweeney’s, Feb 7, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/JT7S-PFUY (noting that, while only 
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1500 were still in Latin, this percentage dropped as the printing 
of Italian, German, French, and Flemish texts became increas-
ingly common.57 The advent of printing spread access to the writ-
ten word beyond a narrow elite, helping to end the dominance of 
Latin as the universal language, fueling the Reformation, and 
further fragmenting papal power as new ties formed along lin-
guistic lines.58 The spread of vernacular works led eventually to 
the establishment of official local languages, a seminal develop-
ment in the emergence of the modern nation-state.59 As Figure 2 
shows, the rise of vernacular languages can be observed directly 
in war manifestos issued by the sovereigns of Europe. The shift-
ing prominence of languages may also reflect a shifting locus of 
conflict in Europe. German, for instance, dominates in the early 
modern period, following the German Reformation. English is 
more common in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
FIGURE 2:  MANIFESTOS BY LANGUAGE 
A brief note about all of the figures and numbers reported in 
this Article is warranted. We must be cautious about drawing 
strong inferences from the collection of manifestos. The figures 
 
30 percent of European adults were literate in 1440, the invention of the printing press and 
further emphasis on education led to 62 percent literacy rates in England by 1800). 
 57 See Febvre and Martin, Coming of the Book at 249, 320–23 (cited in note 54). 
 58 See Anderson, Imagined Communities at 42–43 (cited in note 54). 
 59 See id at 42–46. 
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we offer demonstrate the frequency with which our collection of 
manifestos reflects the relevant characteristic assessed. In read-
ing these figures, it is important to bear in mind that while we do 
have the most extensive set of manifestos available, the set is not 
complete. Many manifestos have been lost or are inaccessible.60 
Hence changes in the collection do not necessarily reflect changes 
in the full set of manifestos issued by sovereigns. Moreover, mani-
festos reveal only the reasons that sovereigns gave for war—and 
therefore what reasons they regarded as legal and legitimate rea-
sons for waging war—not necessarily their true motivations.  
While there is much to learn from the collection, the data should 
be considered in context. 
The production and dissemination of manifestos took place 
through a period of massive transformation in the production and 
dissemination of the printed word.  While books and pamphlets 
were the exclusive products of the printing press in the late fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries (hence manifestos appeared 
largely in these forms during this period), newspapers arrived on 
the scene at the turn of the seventeenth century, leading to yet 
another watershed moment in the evolution of manifesto practice. 
Prior to the advent of the newspaper, current events were primar-
ily spread through word of mouth, as printed books predomi-
nantly contained religious works or classical and contemporary 
literature.61 During the late 1500s and early 1600s, heavy regula-
tions on printing were promulgated in England.62 Such regulation 
may have in fact spurred the explosion of newspapers, as printers 
strove to cram as many tidbits of information into one (approved) 
document as possible. Literacy and readership rates continued to 
grow with the advent of the newspaper, which targeted a larger 
and more diverse audience with issues of local interest, compared 
to the limited pool of religious officials or wealthy scholars that 
consumed books.63 
The manifestos database includes twenty-seven manifestos 
found in newspapers between 1684 and 1941, roughly 8.1 percent 
 
 60 For more on how we located war manifestos, see Appendix. 
 61 See Febvre and Martin, Coming of the Book at 249 (cited in note 54). 
 62 See Henry Richard Fox Bourne, 1 English Newspapers: Chapters in the History of 
Journalism 28–29 (Chatto & Windus 1887) (describing the Licensing Act of 1662, which—
renewing similar restrictions in place between 1585 and 1637—limited the number of mas-
ter printers to twenty and assigned the licensing of political writings to the secretary of 
state and the licensing of legal writings to the lord chancellor and judges only). 
 63 See Laurie Thomas Lee, History and Development of Mass Communications 3–6, 
in 1 Journalism and Mass Communication (2009) (Rashmi Luthra, ed). 
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of the total collection.64 Publication of manifestos in newspapers 
allowed sovereigns to see widespread, almost instantaneous, dis-
semination of their manifestos in order to rally public support for 
war. As Figure 3 shows, as newspapers proliferated, pamphlets 
became less common. After the first newspaper-published mani-
festo we identified, published in 1684,65 the practice of publishing 
manifestos in newspapers grew rapidly, peaking around the turn of 
the nineteenth century. Books may be overrepresented in Figure 3 
because war manifestos were collected and reprinted in books and 
survive today primarily in that form. It is not always clear in 
those collections of reprinted materials where the manifesto first 
appeared. Likely they initially appeared in more immediate 
forms—whether newspapers or pamphlets. 
FIGURE 3:  MANIFESTOS IN NEWSPAPERS 
In the collection, the majority of manifestos published in 
newspapers were printed in British papers, though this may be a 
byproduct of the robustness of modern British collections and the 
ease of access to such collections for Anglophone researchers. 
 
 64 See Appendix for details on methodology. The count of newspapers includes man-
ifestos that we found in limited newspaper collections, but not those initially printed in 
newspapers and then reprinted in books, where we later located them. Thus, this may 
undercount the number of manifestos first printed in newspapers. 
 65 See Lettre en Forme de Manifeste, Touchant l’Affaire de Gironne Mercure Galant 
18–52 (Aug 1684), 
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These manifestos had extraordinary reach. They were not simply 
printed in the national press; they also appeared in regional and 
city-based publications. And they concerned not only conflicts in-
volving Great Britain, but also conflicts throughout Europe.66 
Newspaper-printed manifestos also sometimes were accom-
panied by commentary from the editors or printers, a practice 
that increased over time. For example, commentary surrounding 
the American War of Independence was robust, with many British 
editors (not surprisingly) expressing support for Great Britain.67 
Commentaries even included reactions to the style and substance 
of the manifestos.68 
 
 66 See, for example, Lacrosse, Lescallier, and Coster, Manifesto Addressed to All the 
States, Friends or Allies of the French Republic, to All Governors and Commanders in Chief 
of the Sea and Land Forces in the West Indies, to the Captains and Commanders of the 
Different Ships of War Belonging to the States, Stationed for the Protection of Their Re-
spective Colonies, or Navigating in These Seas, The Derby Mercury (1802), archived at  
http://perma.cc/3B2P-2LJ7 (issued by France to its allies to establish the government of 
Guadaloupe and its dependencies, in reference to the Haitian Revolution); Manifesto of the 
States General of the United Provinces, in Answer in the Following Proclamation of Gen. 
Dumourier, The Scots Magazine 172 (Apr 1, 1793); Manifesto and Declaration of His Prus-
sian Majesty to the City of Dantzick (1793), archived at http://perma.cc/C82A-JHQE; Mani-
festo of the Government of Bruxelles in Answer to the Declaration of War on the Part of 
France 1 (1792), archived at http://perma.cc/ZWP9-U6HW; Manifesto of Her Imperial and 
Royal Apostolic Majesty the Empress of Germany and Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, 
and Declaration to All the Respective Princes and States of the Roman Empire, Concerning 
the Illegal and Hostile Enterprises of His Majesty the King of Prussia, in Opposition to Her 
Natural and Legitimate Rights to the Succession of Lower Bavaria, The Scots Magazine 
517 (Oct 1, 1778), archived at http://perma.cc/2BFQ-4644. A few manifestos were reprinted 
in multiple newspapers, indicating some cross-pollination between various outlets. See, 
for example, M. Condorcett, Manifesto, to All States and Nations, Decreed by the French 
National Assembly, and Presented to the King, Chester Chronicle 4 (Jan 13, 1792), also 
printed in 23 The Norfolk Chronicle 2 (Jan 14, 1792); A Manifesto, Displaying the Motives 
and Conduct of His Most Christian Majesty towards England, The Scots Magazine 345 
(July 5, 1779), also printed in 10 The Norfolk Chronicle 4 (July 31, 1779), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GT3A-QHU6; Manifesto, 25 The Leeds Intelligencer 4 (Dec 29, 1778), also 
printed in 59 Northampton Mercury 4 (Dec 28, 1778); Earl of Carlisle, Sir Henry Clinton, 
and William Eden, A Manifesto and Proclamation, to the Members of the Congress, the 
Members of the General Assemblies, and All Others, Free Inhabitants of the Colonies, The 
Scots Magazine 607 (Nov 1, 1778), archived at http://perma.cc/JSL5-G8QL, also printed in 
The Reading Mercury and Oxford Gazette 4 (Dec 7, 1778). 
 67 See, for example, Manifesto, 25 The Leeds Intelligencer at 4 (Dec 29, 1778) (cited 
in note 66): 
It is not true, that the measures of Great Britain towards her colonies have been 
tyrannical, or, if they will, be tyrannous. It is, on the contrary, well known, that 
no Colonies were ever planted on so fair a ground of public generosity and free-
dom, and that, consequently, no Colonies ever advanced with so rapid a progress 
in population and wealth. 
 68 See, for example, Manifesto of the Government of Bruxelles, in Answer to the Dec-
laration of War on the Part of France at 1 (cited in note 66): 
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This democratization of access to—and commentary on—war 
manifestos was reflected in the manifestos themselves. The lan-
guage used in manifestos over this period became more practical, 
pointed, and matter-of-fact. The elaborate, theoretical orations 
that were popular before the advent of the printing press and 
newspapers gave way to language that would appeal to the ordi-
nary public, which was now the target audience. 
D. The Slow Decline of Manifestos 
The frequency of the publication of manifestos peaked at the 
turn of the eighteenth century, as Figure 4 demonstrates. After 
1775, it appears, states issued far fewer manifestos, until the two 
world wars in the twentieth century.69 
FIGURE 4:  MANIFESTO PUBLICATION FREQUENCY 
 
It is with great satisfaction we are enabled to present this Proclamation to our 
Readers: It is not more valuable for being a matter of very important knowledge, 
than that it is one of the most eloquent declarations, and contains the soundest 
reasoning we ever read. Every line of it is full of energy;—it cuts to the very root 
the new doctrine of the Parisian Fanatics, and tends to discourage the same at-
tempts of our Reformers at home. 
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There are several likely reasons for this decline. In the nineteenth 
century, Europe was less torn by wars than in centuries past.70 
This decline in conflict likely led to a corresponding decline in war 
manifestos. Conflict shifted from the heart of Europe to the 
periphery (especially the Balkans), where records were less well 
preserved or where they have been maintained in collections 
inaccessible to us. Moreover, the new imperial period of colonial 
expansion by European powers directed conflicts away from 
Europe and toward areas regarded by many as terra nullius—
land without proper sovereign authorities against whom war 
manifestos must be issued.71 Notably, however, this does not 
explain the absence of manifestos during the Napoleonic period. 
Professor Anuschka Tischer hypothesizes that manifestos waned 
during this moment not because conflict between sovereigns 
declined or because of changes in the location of conflict, but 
 
 69 Compare, for example, Declaration Veritable des Caules & Occalions de la Pres-
sente Guerre de Parme (1511), archived at http://perma.cc/CC9S-SR6F, with Lacrosse, 
Lescallier, and Coster, Manifesto Addressed to All the States (cited in note 66). While both 
manifestos were written by French noblemen, they exhibit a remarkable difference in tone 
based in large part on the intended audience. The 1510 speech by Lodovico Eliano was 
addressed directly to Maximilian, Holy Roman Emperor, at a meeting of German princes 
in relation to the War of the League of Cambrai. As such, it is marked with flourishes, 
long sentences, and sophisticated language, and continues for twenty pages. In contrast, 
Captain General Lacrosse’s 1802 manifesto on the Haitian Revolution, which was pub-
lished on one page of an English newspaper, opened with the statement that it is “Ad-
dressed to all the States, Friends or Allies of the French Republic” and ends with an ex-
hortation that privateers near the island of Guadaloupe “will be looked upon as pirates, 
and treated accordingly with all the severity pointed out by Law.” Envisioning a broader 
audience, Captain Lacrosse’s language is far more brief, pointed, and practical than that 
of his sixteenth-century counterpart. 
 70 See Perry Anderson, The New Old World 519 (Verso 2009). Some have theorized 
that a rise in democracy and corresponding decline in religiosity across the continent may 
have reduced the number of conflicts, and hence the number of manifestos, in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. See, for example, Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Chris-
tian Democracy in Europe 258–61 (Cornell 1996). This would not explain the dearth of 
Napoleonic manifestos. Indeed, the collection includes no manifestos from the European 
powers from 1802 to 1815, a time that was ravaged by war. Tischer hypothesizes that 
manifestos fell out of favor because of the French Revolution, which changed the nature 
of sovereign communication in Europe. See Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen (cited 
in note 10). 
 71 The manifestos that were issued were less likely to be reprinted in full. Instead, 
they were embedded within news stories, not as stand-alone documents. Embedded dis-
cussions or citations of portions of manifestos were not included in our collection—only 
stand-alone documents are included. As a result, there is a possibility that the collection’s 
decline in numbers after the late 1700s is artificial. To check the representativeness of the 
collection, we consulted all previous manifesto collections. See generally Tischer, Offizielle 
Kriegsbegründungen (cited in note 10); Repgen, Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa (cited 
in note 10); Klesmann, Bellum Solemne (cited in note 10). These confirmed a more limited 
number of manifestos after the late 1700s. 
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instead because the shared sense of community among Christian 
European sovereigns collapsed as a result of the French 
Revolution, leading to the breakdown of what was essentially a 
cooperative communicative practice.72 
It is possible, as well, that modernization facilitated more 
rapid and informal modes of communication, relegating the 
manifesto to a stoic and staid formality that sovereigns may have 
begun to consider inessential to conflict resolution. We see the 
culmination of this development during the First World War, 
when some countries, though they issued compilations of their 
diplomatic correspondence, did not always issue formal 
statements of their reasons for war.73 
At the same time, much of what appears to be decline may 
instead simply represent transformation. The nineteenth century 
witnessed a dramatic change in the relationship between the 
leadership and the populations of modern states. Manifestos, 
recall, were originally documents addressed by a sovereign to 
other sovereigns. The population was largely a bystander to that 
exchange. As the modern state emerged, populations were 
increasingly the primary audience for messages issued by state 
leadership. 
We see some of the changing practice, for example, in war 
messages issued by presidents of the United States. These 
messages, though called by another name to avoid the 
monarchical and Old World overtones of that word, still fulfilled 
the function of manifestos. They explained the reasons for war to 
the public in an effort to rally support and persuade the public 
that war was justified. 
In 1846, President James Polk gave a speech outlining the 
legal reasons for war in order to convince the country that the war 
with Mexico was justified.74 He knew that sizable domestic 
factions, especially the antislavery contingent, would attack his 
administration for engaging in what they deemed to be a mere 
war of conquest. To rebut his critics, Polk had to show that there 
were good legal justifications for war. His message to Congress 
did this, arguing that Mexico’s failure to pay its debts to the 
 
 72 See Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen at 23 (cited in note 10). 
 73 Some countries did issue manifestos, either separately or in connection with their 
published compilations of diplomatic correspondence, and we have included these in our 
collection. 
 74 See James K. Polk, By the President of the United States of America: A Proclama-
tion (May 13, 1846), archived at http://perma.cc/447A-GHJW. 
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United States provided a just cause for war. This war message 
signals a shift in the purpose of war manifestos. Whereas before 
the primary purpose of issuing manifestos was to satisfy the sov-
ereign’s obligations before God and his fellow sovereigns, with the 
need to rally popular support serving as only a secondary goal, 
popular support now became the crucial factor. The traditional 
elements of manifestos remained, of course, but they became ves-
tigial over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the 
time of the world wars, manifestos tended to portray the conflict 
not simply as enforcement of a legal right or even as the punish-
ment of criminal behavior, but as a fight for the survival of civili-
zation itself. Such a transformation, though doubtless effective in 
securing popular support, further undermined the sense of the 
community of sovereigns that Tischer rightly recognizes as un-
derpinning prior manifesto practice and the international order it 
represented. The decline of manifestos, then, signals a shift in the 
relationship between those who govern and those who are gov-
erned. Increasingly, the final judge of a sovereign’s actions was 
his citizenry. 
One intriguing, related feature of nineteenth-century mani-
festos, which continues in the twentieth century, is a gradual shift 
in emphasis away from a strictly defined set of legitimate justifi-
cations for war to broader appeals to general principles of moral-
ity. In some respects this appears to reflect the spread of Enlight-
enment ideals, which tended to value reason and natural law more 
highly than the decrees of sovereigns. Thus we see in American 
manifestos—both in the nineteenth and in the twentieth centu-
ries—the invocation of the ideal of spreading liberty, a cause of 
war that did not satisfy the classical requirements for casus 
belli.75 However, such arguments, though invalid for the purposes 
of international law, could potentially prove very effective in 
 
 75 Then, as now, other sovereigns sometimes regarded such rhetoric as nothing but 
a cloak for simple aggression. For example, at the onset of the Mexican-American War, 
the interim Mexican president observed: 
In exchange for their domination, the North Americans offer liberty and democ-
racy, peace and abundance. Yes, the peace and abundance that they have 
brought to the indigenous tribes, requiring them to live as nomads; the democ-
racy that people of color enjoy in the United States, where they are deprived of 
every civil and political right and excluded from all public activities, even reli-
gious services. 
 Manifiesto del Exmo. Sr. Presidente Interino de la República Mexicana 16 (July 26, 1846), 
archived at http://perma.cc/T3LW-RWZN. 
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drumming up support for controversial military adventures.76 As 
the line between legal document and propaganda continued to 
blur, it is perhaps understandable that the legal document would 
cease to carry as much weight as it once had. 
War manifestos came to an end for yet another reason: the 
prohibition on war in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, reaffirmed 
after World War II in the 1945 UN Charter, brought about the 
end of legal warfare for all but a very limited set of reasons. As 
noted at the outset, the UN Charter permits states to wage war 
for only a few reasons. A state that intends to use force must ei-
ther justify it as a legitimate act of self-defense (for which it is 
required to file an Article 51 letter with the United Nations), per-
suade the Security Council to authorize the use of force in a reso-
lution passed pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, or win the 
consent of the host state.77 After this transition, it was no longer 
sufficient to point to “just causes,” such as unpaid debts or broken 
treaty promises. 
With the history of manifestos practice complete, we turn in 
the next Part to the purposes of manifestos. Why did sovereigns 
bother with this cumbersome process? 
III.  THE PURPOSES OF MANIFESTOS 
The practice of manifesto writing in the postmedieval period 
may seem mysterious. Why did sovereigns expend so much en-
ergy on these manifestos when most of them were absolute mon-
archs?78 Writing manifestos required expertise and skill, and dis-
seminating them was labor intensive, particularly before the 
advent of the newspaper. There were no international organiza-
tions that could veto sovereigns’ resort to force, no voting public 
to cast them out of office. The requirement of offering public 
 
 76 See, for example, Woodrow Wilson, Address of the President, 65th Cong, 2d Sess 
(Apr 2, 1917), archived at http://perma.cc/DU4Z-N464. 
 77 See notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 78 The great legal authorities of the time noted that issuing war manifestos was com-
mon practice. See, for example, Vattel, Law of Nations, 3.4.64 at 318–19 (cited in note 6); 
James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law, 48–71 (Little, Brown 13th ed 1884) 
(Charles M. Barnes, ed); Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, 2 The Principles of Natural and Poli-
tic Law, 4.4.24 at 363–64 (Bumstead 4th ed 1792) (Thomas Nugent, trans). Professor 
Tischer argues that manifestos are best understood as part of a larger communicative 
process among European sovereigns that took place against the backdrop of a shared set 
of Christian values. Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen at 89–95 (cited in note 10). We 
focus on the legal and political functions of manifestos, which often overlap with this com-
municative function but are not limited to it. 
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justifications for their wars, moreover, constrained their capacity 
to launch wars. Yes, they could certainly make bad arguments—
and they sometimes did—but making those arguments public 
subjected them to possible disapprobation. What’s more, the laws 
of war rewarded victorious sovereigns regardless of whether they 
had just causes. When the United States conquered California 
during the Mexican-American War, its claim to California did not 
depend on whether President Polk was actually legally justified 
in invading Mexico. Victory in war brought victory at law. Might 
made legal right. So why did sovereigns go through the trouble of 
commissioning elaborate war manifestos? 
One reason is clear: it was the law. According to the laws of 
war, sovereigns were under a legal obligation. Emmerich de Vattel 
claimed that the publication of manifestos was required by cus-
tomary international law. Although natural law mandated only 
that sovereigns declare war, he maintained that “custom has in-
troduced certain formalities in the business,” one of them being 
that “manifestos are issued.”79 Despite the authority of Vattel, 
some sovereigns denied that they were obliged to publish mani-
festos. In his manifesto for the War of the Quadruple Alliance, 
Louis XV began by asserting that “Kings are not Accountable for 
their Proceedings to any but God himself.”80 Nevertheless, he 
went on to explain, “[T]is for their glory, and the Tranquility of 
their people, which can’t be separated, that the Motives of their 
Resolutions should be known, they ought to act publickly in the 
Face of the World, and to manifest the Justice of what they have 
consulted in private.”81 
The laws of war, however, were not the only reason that sov-
ereigns issued war manifestos. Manifestos served a multitude of 
overlapping legal, personal, practical, and political purposes that 
made them indispensable. 
A. Encouraging Settlement 
Manifestos served an important practical purpose. Put 
simply, a manifesto could help avoid war. A manifesto made the 
grievances of a state manifest. This set the stage for waging legit-
imate war, of course. But it also gave the opposing state an 
 
 79 Vattel, Law of Nations 3.4.55, 64 at 316 (cited in note 6). See also id at 318–19. 
 80 King of France’s Declaration of War at 9 (A. Bell 1719) (cited in note 24), archived 
at http://perma.cc/79JJ-QLKY. 
 81 Id at 10. 
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opportunity to head off the conflict. Like a modern complaint, war 
manifestos gave states a formal avenue to outline grievances by 
which they were authorized to use force against a neighboring 
state. And when the reasons were strong, a target state might 
choose to negotiate—or even capitulate—rather than go to war. 
The use of manifestos as precursors to settlement can be seen 
in exchanges of manifestos and what we term counter-manifestos. 
Counter-manifestos are responsive manifestos, addressed to 
states that had issued manifestos against the responding state. 
These documents were used by states to respond directly to the 
claims made by an issuing state in the original manifesto, mar-
shaling reasons and facts to head off or influence a potential con-
flict. 
Counter-manifestos are a logical outgrowth of a just cause re-
quirement in the law of nations. When sovereigns publicly artic-
ulated their just cause for the use of force in advance of going to 
war, sovereign states against whom war was to be waged were 
given the opportunity to read—and thus an opportunity to dis-
pute—the rationale given by a sovereign state against them. Tar-
geted states frequently took advantage of this opportunity, under-
mining either the logic or facts presented in the original 
manifesto, asserting a different telling of the same story, or even 
acknowledging the manifesto as accurate but offering peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. The counter-manifestos, therefore, 
served as a means by which states could justify their own war, 
attempt a settlement, or motivate an issuing state to instead pur-
sue lasting peace. 
The practice of exchanging manifestos and counter-manifes-
tos demonstrates yet again that manifestos were not mere pieces 
of paper. They were understood as meaningful documents. Like a 
complaint in a lawsuit, the manifesto outlined the claims that one 
sovereign had against another. And like a complaint, the claims 
had to be framed in terms of what the law allowed. A sovereign 
may have wanted a piece of land because it was valuable (just as 
a person filing a lawsuit wants the money award), but the sover-
eign had to give good reasons—“just reasons”—for which the law 
permitted a state to go to war before launching a war to take it (“I 
want it” was not a legally cognizable claim).82 And like an answer 
in a lawsuit, counter-manifestos sought to counter those claims—
 
 82 For more on the reasons that sovereigns gave—reasons that were “just causes” for 
war—see Part IV. 
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offer reasons why the facts did not support them or, in some cases, 
offer counterclaims against the original complainant. These ex-
changes sometimes led to war, but they also sometimes led to 
peace—just as lawsuits sometimes settle out of court without go-
ing to trial. 
Our research identified three kinds of counter-manifestos: 
those leading to war, those leading to settlement, and those lead-
ing to lasting peace. In the first form, the issuing state articulates 
its just cause of war, and the responding state counters with its 
own just cause of war. The manifestos and counter-manifestos 
serve to amplify the conflict. But the second form of manifestos 
and counter-manifestos leads to something entirely different: ac-
quiescence. In this form, the responding state makes one of three 
defensive choices: it makes a tacit admission of liability, it defen-
sively cedes to the demands of the issuing state, or it offers to 
issue a nuisance payment to alleviate any aggression. Regardless 
of the choice, in each situation the responding state pursues an 
almost judicial settlement in order to preserve peace. Finally, in 
the third, and least common, form, states issue manifestos and 
counter-manifestos that ultimately address their disagreements 
and resolve the original dispute. 
1. Manifesto and counter-manifesto lead to war. 
The majority of the counter-manifestos surveyed represented 
a point-counterpoint response by a responding state, in which the 
sovereign attacked each argument raised in the original mani-
festo. After refuting all of the affirmative arguments raised by the 
issuing state, the responding state would then offer its own just 
cause for attacking the state that issued the original manifesto. 
With the two sides unable to agree, war ensued. 
For example, in 1673, England and the Netherlands ex-
changed a series of manifestos and counter-manifestos pertaining 
to the Third Anglo-Dutch War. The original manifesto was from 
the States General of the Netherlands, enumerating grievances 
against England. The Dutch reasons for going to war included 
self-defense, balance of power considerations, and protection of 
trade interests.83 But the king of England was not silent. He is-
sued a counter-manifesto of his own, with a point-by-point 
 
 83 See A Letter Sent by the States-General of the United Provinces to the King of Great 
Britain (Oct 25, 1673), archived at http://perma.cc/L2LF-SDBZ. 
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refutation of the arguments made in the Dutch manifesto. As the 
manifesto explained: 
[Y]et for the Vindication of Our Honour, as well as for the 
undeceiving that part of the World which may be abused by 
it, We would not suffer it to remain without a distinct Reply 
from point to point as they lie in your Paper (which We send 
you by the same hand that brought Us yours).84 
Unable to come to agreement, and having laid out their argument 
for their fellow sovereigns and populations to read and judge, the 
two sovereigns went to war instead. 
2. Manifesto and counter-manifesto lead to settlement. 
Some manifestos and their counter-manifestos led sovereigns 
to peace, rather than conflict. Responding states sometimes used 
counter-manifestos to neutralize the logic of the issuing state, 
leaving it without a just cause of war. Other times, sovereigns 
appeared to weigh the costs of publicly issuing an apology or pay-
ing a settlement against the cost of going to war, finding humili-
ation a less costly burden to bear. 
a) The Caroline incident.  One example of manifestos and 
counter-manifestos leading to settlement can be found in the let-
ters surrounding the famous “Caroline incident”—the 1837 de-
struction of the privately owned US steamboat by British forces 
in the midst of a Canadian insurrection. The correspondence be-
tween the American and British officials is taught in nearly every 
international law course, for it offers the first known legal stand-
ard of self-defense in the law of armed conflict. What few realize 
is that the incident also serves as an example of how the exchange 
of manifestos and counter-manifestos could, and did, de-escalate 
conflicts. 
The Caroline incident was sparked by a poorly organized re-
bel force in Canada.85 On December 29, 1837, the Caroline, a 
 
 84 His Majesties Answer to the Letter Sent from the States General of the United Prov-
inces of the Low Countreys, by Their Trumpeter (1673), archived at http://perma.cc/DZ4B 
-DG4Q (describing the dispute between England and the Netherlands in relation to the 
Third Anglo-Dutch War) (emphasis added). 
 85 For historical material surrounding the Caroline Incident, see Martin A. Rogoff 
and Edward Collings Jr, The Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law, 
16 Brooklyn J Intl L 493, 494–95 (1990); Albert B. Corey, The Crisis of 1830–1842 in Ca-
nadian-American Relations 61–69 (Yale 1941); R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod 
Cases, 32 Am J Intl L 82, 82–92 (1938). It is worth noting that there is some question of 
the extent to which the letters related here were intended for public consumption (one of 
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privately owned US steamboat, conveyed men and supplies to the 
rebel forces. When the Caroline docked in port in New York State, 
Andrew Drew, the commander of the Upper Canadian militia, 
sent the Royal Navy to destroy it under cover of night. Drew and 
his men seized the ship, towed it into the Niagara, and burned it. 
Two people—Amos Durfee and an unnamed cabin boy—were said 
to have been killed in the skirmish (though later accounts ques-
tion whether any deaths, in fact, occurred). On May 22, 1838, US 
Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote a public letter to Henry 
Fox, the British minister in Washington. Though not labeled a 
manifesto, it had all the characteristics of one: it was public, was 
issued by a sovereign, was issued to a sovereign, and offered rea-
sons justifying war. In it, Forsyth made a “demand for reparation” 
to the British government.86 A second letter from the Americans 
called the “whole proceeding . . . a manifest act of hostile and dar-
ing aggression upon [the United States’] right and sovereignty, 
utterly inconsistent with all the principles of national law, and 
wholly irreconcilable with the friendly and peaceful relations of 
the two countries.”87 
On December 13, 1840, Fox responded with a counterclaim, 
demanding the release of Alexander McLeod, a deputy sheriff 
that had been, he said, wrongly imprisoned over the incident.88 
The counterclaim was later backed by a threat: after a New York 
grand jury indicted McLeod on seventeen counts, the British for-
eign secretary, Lord Palmerston, told the US minister to London, 
“[I]f McLeod is executed, there must be war,” and the minister 
quickly passed this message along to the president.89 
On April 24, 1841, the new US Secretary of State, Daniel 
Webster, wrote to Fox, proposing a rubric for judging acts of self-
 
the four criteria for a manifesto). It appears that the letters were, indeed, published nearly 
contemporaneously and that the authors understood that what they wrote would be made 
public. We determined, therefore, that the exchange did meet the definition. 
 86 Letter from Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Fox (Dec 31, 1840), in John Lansing Wendell, ed, 
25 Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature and in the 
Court for the Correction of Errors of the State of New-York 503 (Wendell 2d ed 1850). 
 87 Letter from Mr. Stevenson to Lord Palmerston (May 22, 1838), in John Lansing 
Wendell, ed, 25 Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court at 489–95 
(cited in note 86). 
 88 Arthur T. Downey, The Creole Affair: The Slave Rebellion That Led the U.S. and 
Great Britain to the Brink of War 58–59 (Rowman & Littlefield 2014). 
 89 Letter from Lord Palmerston to Henry Fox (Feb 9, 1841), in Evelyn Ashley, ed, 1 
The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston 408 (Richard 
Bentley & Son 1879). 
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defense in the future.90 Additionally, a presidential message 
stated that no “atonement as was due for the public wrong done 
to the United States by this invasion of her territory, so wholly 
irreconcilable with her rights as an independent power, has yet 
been made.”91 Lord Ashburton, now representing Britain in the 
matter, issued a conciliatory counter-manifesto a few months 
later, with a “mission to endeavor to settle, the unfortunate case 
of the Caroline, with its attendant consequences.”92 He wrote: “[I]t 
must be admitted that there was in the hurried execution of this 
necessary service a violation of territory.”93 Ashburton was apolo-
getic, using language of amends-making: 
[W]hat is perhaps most to be regretted is that some explana-
tion and apology for this occurrence was not immediately 
made: this with a frank explanation of the necessity of the 
case might and probably would have prevented much of the 
exasperation and of the subsequent complaints and recrimi-
nations to which it gave rise.94 
Webster’s final letter, on August 6, 1842, declared the dispute 
settled. Webster was pleased that Ashburton had accepted the ru-
bric proposed by the Americans in self-defense. He concluded that 
“the President is content to receive these acknowledgments and 
assurances in the conciliatory spirit which marks your Lordship’s 
letter, and will make this subject, as a complaint of violation of 
territory, the topic of no further discussion between the two 
Governments.”95 
b) The Nootka crisis. The Nootka Crisis began when British 
ships were captured by Spanish ships in Nootka Sound, located 
near Vancouver Island, Canada. After the seizure, the king went 
before Parliament to explain that he had “directed his minister at 
Madrid to . . . claim such full and adequate satisfaction as the na-
ture of the case evidently requires.”96 
 
 90 Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox (Apr 24, 1841) (Avalon Project, 2008), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7VEH-BPPG. 
 91 Presidential Message of December 7, 1841 (Avalon Project, 2008), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7VEH-BPPG. 
 92 Letter from Lord Ashburton to Daniel Webster (July 28, 1842) (Avalon Project, 
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/7VEH-BPPG. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug 6, 1842) (Avalon Project, 
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/7VEH-BPPG. 
 96 The manifesto itself is not in the collection, and we have been unable to locate it. 
But it is echoed in the King’s speech. See Message from King George III, in Alexander 
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The Court of Spain responded with conciliatory language.97 
Great Britain accepted the Spanish overtures of de-escalation: 
“The Court of London is animated with the most sincere desire of 
terminating the difference that at present subsists between it and 
the court of Madrid.”98 However, Great Britain insisted on repa-
rations: “[A]s a preliminary condition, upon a prompt and suitable 
reparation for those acts of violence,” including “the restitution of 
the vessels, a full indemnification for the losses sustained by the 
parties injured, and, finally, satisfaction to the sovereign for the 
insult offered to his flag.”99 The Spanish monarch agreed, and the 
matter was resolved.100 War had been averted. 
3. Manifesto and counter-manifesto lead to peace treaty. 
The exchange of manifesto and counter-manifesto sometimes 
led to peace treaties. The exchanged declarations, then, turn from 
sovereigns alleging reasons to go to war into sovereigns articulat-
ing reasons to remain in peace. Here, manifestos and counter-
 
Begg, History of British Columbia from Its Earliest Discovery to the Present Time 40–41 
(William Briggs 1894), archived at http://perma.cc/TQ6W-RLRG: 
His Majesty has now directed his minister at Madrid to make a fresh represen-
tation on this subject, and to claim such full and adequate satisfaction as the 
nature of the case evidently requires. And under these circumstances his Majesty, 
having also received information that considerable armaments are carrying on 
in the ports of Spain, has judged it indispensably necessary to give orders for 
making such preparations as may put it in his Majesty’s power to act with vigor 
and effect in support of the honor of his crown and the interests of his people. 
 97 See Memorial of the Court of Spain, Delivered June 13th, 1790, to Mr. Fitzherbert, the 
British Ambassador at Madrid, in History of British Columbia at 42–46 (cited in note 96): 
By Article 8th of the Treaty of Utrecht . . . Spain and England profess to estab-
lish it as a fundamental principle of agreement, that the navigation and com-
merce of the West Indies, under the dominion of Spain, shall remain in the pre-
cise situation in which they stood in the reign of his Catholic Majesty Charles II. 
. . . 
[T]hese seas had been, for some years past, more frequented than formerly. 
. . . 
If this pretension is found to trespass upon the ancient boundaries laid down in 
the reign of King Charles II, and guaranteed by England in the Treaty of 
Utrecht, as Spain believes, it appears that that court will have good reason for 
disputing and opposing this claim. 
 98 Mr. Fitzherbert Replied as Follows, in History of British Columbia at 46–47 (cited 
in note 96). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Copy of the Convention between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Spain. 
Signed at the Escurial, the 28th of October, 1790, in 28 The Parliamentary Register; Or 
History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons 36–38 (J. Debrett 1791), 
archived at http://perma.cc/S7XH-AVPK. 
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manifestos function as two sides of the same coin: the first, a sov-
ereign state’s public rationale for going to war, and the second, a 
sovereign state’s rationale for protecting against it. 
Take the Eden Agreement: a treaty, signed by France and 
England, resolving a dispute raised in a missing French commu-
nication made to the Court of London on September 16, 1787 (ac-
cording to a later letter that references the first manifesto).101 
While the original manifesto is missing, we know that it sparked 
“warlike preparations” within England, likely over conflicts re-
garding cotton and wool manufacturers. Following the original 
French manifesto, England offered peace on October 27, 1787, 
stating: 
If the Court of Versailles is disposed to explain itself upon 
this subject, and upon the conduct to be adopted towards the 
republic, . . . all warlike preparations, should be discontinued 
on each side, and [ ] the navies of the two nations should be 
again placed upon the footing of the peace establishment.102 
The French, in turn, issued its Counter Declaration (a coun-
ter-manifesto) on the same day: 
The Intention of His majesty not being, and never having 
been, to interfere by Force in the Affairs of the republic of the 
United Provinces, . . . His majesty makes no difficulty to de-
clare, That he will not give any Effect to the Declaration 
above mentioned; and that he retains no hostile View to-
wards any Quarter, relative to what has passed in Holland. 
. . . [T]he armaments, and in general all Warlike Prepara-
tions, shall be discontinued on each Side.103 
The parties, which appear to have been in the same place 
(Versailles) and mirroring each other’s language, then issued a 
joint declaration noting the legal significance of their exchange of 
letters: 
In consequence of the Declaration, and Counter-Declaration, 
exchanged this Day, the undersigned, in the Name of their 
respective Sovereigns, agree, That the Armaments, and in 
 
 101 See Declaration and Counter Declaration Exchanged at Versailles, between the 
Ministers of His Britannic Majesty and the Most Christian King, Oct. 27, 1787, in The New 
Annual Register, or General Repository of History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 
1787 70–71 (Robinson 1788), archived at http://perma.cc/QQ6W-HSM2. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id at 71. 
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general all Warlike Preparations, shall be discontinued on 
each Side; and that the Navies of the Two Nations shall be 
again placed upon the Footing of the Peace Establishment.104 
The exchange of manifesto and counter-manifesto thus led 
not only to the resolution of the dispute at hand, but also to a 
peace treaty that was meant to last. 
B. Assuaging the Sovereign’s Conscience 
Even when manifestos failed to avoid war, they served many 
important purposes. The first was a personal benefit for the sov-
ereign. War consists of the mass killing of human beings and the 
extensive taking of their territory and property. These are not 
morally neutral acts—they are the most serious harms humans 
can inflict on one another. Not to justify one’s action is to risk 
being seen as a moral monster, someone who does not care about 
the sanctity of human life and the integrity of territorial bounda-
ries and personal property. 
Being seen as morally monstrous had costs. Perhaps most ob-
viously, sovereigns cared about their image and their place in his-
tory. They wanted to be thought of and remembered as wise, cou-
rageous, just, righteous, virtuous—in short, great. To be regarded 
as the slaughterer of innocent people and thief of land and prop-
erty did not further that objective. It represented the sovereign as 
cruel, craven, unjust, vicious—in short, evil. 
But for sovereigns during most of the period in which war 
manifestos were common, the need for a persuasive war mani-
festo was even more urgent: the sovereign’s own soul was on the 
line. The exercise of state violence is a troubling fact in any age, 
but in the early modern era, the burden of moral responsibility 
for such exercise rested almost entirely on the shoulders of the 
sovereign monarch. Others could excuse themselves as having 
simply acted in obedience to the monarch or having offered the 
best advice they could, but the final decision—and therefore the 
final responsibility—rested with the ruler. All-powerful on earth 
he might be, but even he had to give an account for his actions 
before God. Consequently, every ruler had to observe the law 
scrupulously, lest he incur the wrath of God. As King James I of 
England put it, “[Y]et doth God never leave Kings unpunished 
 
 104 Translation of the Joint-Declaration, Signed at Versailles the 27th October 1787, 
by the Duke of Dorset, Mr. Eden, and the Count de Montmorin, in 43 Journals of the House 
of Commons 12 (1803), archived at http://perma.cc/66Y6-CNZV. 
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when they transgress these limits. . . . The higher we are placed, 
the greater shall our fall be.”105 
Particularly in Catholic countries, this appearance before the 
divine tribunal did not await the Day of Judgment but took the 
concrete form of the monarch’s regular unburdening of his con-
science before his confessor.106 Actions of state formed a critical 
part of these audiences, and confessors were expected to serve as 
a check on their royal penitents’ worst tendencies.107 In the polit-
ical theory of the day, the monarch possessed both a private and 
a public persona, and the public conscience of the king, owing to 
the weightier matters that pressed upon it, labored under a cor-
respondingly heavy moral burden. As Cardinal Richelieu, himself 
no fanatic, wrote, “Many [rulers] could save themselves as private 
persons, but are damned by their conduct as public persons. One 
of the Greatest Kings in our neighbourhood recognized this Truth 
on his deathbed, and he cried that he did not fear [his own private 
sin] but that of the King.”108 
Royal confessors therefore acquired an important and privi-
leged role in royal courts. They enjoyed greater access to the sov-
ereign than perhaps any other of his counselors and also enjoyed 
a greater freedom of speech. In return, they owed the sovereign 
their loyalty and, of course, a duty of absolute confidentiality. In 
the seventeenth century, kings often consulted their confessors to 
help them to avoid sinning in the exercise of their duties.109 Moral 
theologians drew up manuals to assist confessors in their task of 
guiding the royal conscience. These manuals paid careful atten-
tion to the particular acts of state that might lead monarchs into 
sin. The waging of an unjust war held particular prominence in 
some of these manuals, and the moral theologians considered it a 
mortal sin.110 
 
 105 James I of England, A Speech to the Lord and Commons of the Parliament at 
White-Hall, on Wednesday the 21 March 1609, in King James VI and I: Political Writings 
179, 183–84 (Cambridge 1994) (Johann P. Somerville, ed) (spelling modernized). 
 106 For an in-depth discussion of the practice and evolution of royal confession in the 
early modern period, see generally Nicole Reinhardt, Voices of Conscience: Royal Confes-
sors and Political Counsel in Seventeenth-Century Spain and France (Oxford 2016). 
 107 Indeed, Louis XIV’s confessor was popularly blamed for many of his tyrannical 
actions, including his propensity for waging unjust wars. See id at 331–32. 
 108 Id at 319, quoting Cardinal Richelieu, Testament Politique de Richelieu 373 (So-
ciété de l’Histoire de France 1995) (Françoise Hildesheimer, ed). 
 109 See Reinhardt, Voices of Conscience at 197 (cited in note 106). 
 110 See id at 89. In Roman Catholic moral theology, a mortal sin is a sin so egregious 
that it disrupts the relationship between the sinner and God and deprives the sinner of 
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Apart from the eternal consequences, the moral burden of 
kingship could have further temporal effects in those realms, such 
as France and England, where the monarch exercised, by virtue 
of his anointing and coronation, a sacred, almost divine function 
within his kingdom.111 In such countries, royal legitimacy derived 
in large part from the king’s role as mediator between God and 
his people, an office that depended on the monarch’s own moral 
purity. Important royal functions—such as the bestowal of the 
royal touch, believed to convey divine healing—required the king 
to be in a state of grace and to have participated in the sacra-
ments.112 When the king failed to maintain the state of grace, as 
when Louis XV was deprived of the sacraments for many years 
due to his open and notorious debauchery, it compromised his 
ability to fulfill his royal duties and undermined his legitimacy.113 
Protestant rulers did not generally have the same obligation 
to give a regular account of their actions before a clergyman, but 
they held the same moral responsibility and, in some cases, exer-
cised the same sacral functions as their Catholic counterparts. 
Without the advice of a confessor to guide them, they depended 
all the more on other ways of maintaining and demonstrating 
their clear conscience before God. Manifestos, by enumerating the 
various requirements of a just war and signaling the sovereign’s 
fulfillment of each condition, gave both Protestant and Catholic 
sovereigns the opportunity to walk through their reasoning and 
assure themselves that they were, in fact, acting in good con-
science and from sound motives. As James I put it: 
[J]ust kings will ever be willing to declare what they will do, 
if they will not incur the curse of God. I will not be content 
that my power be disputed upon: but I shall ever be willing 
to make the reason appear of all my doings, and rule my ac-
tions according to my Laws.114 
Accordingly, kings did not issue war manifestos only to justify 
themselves before their subjects or their fellow sovereigns, but 
also to justify themselves before God. 
 
grace. If one who has committed a mortal sin dies unshriven, he incurs the penalty of 
eternal punishment in hell. 
 111 See generally Ronald G. Asch, Sacral Kingship between Disenchantment & Re-
enchantment: The French and English Monarchies 1587–1688 (Berghahn 2014). 
 112 See Reinhardt, Voices of Conscience at 371–72 (cited in note 106). 
 113 See id at 372. 
 114 James I, Political Writings at 184 (spelling modernized) (cited in note 105). 
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C. Rallying Domestic Support 
Beyond assuaging the sovereign’s conscience, war manifestos 
served several other important purposes for the war that fol-
lowed. Sovereigns needed to make arguments that were suffi-
ciently compelling to raise and support an army. Citizens who 
read the manifestos were asked to sacrifice life and limb in sup-
port of their sovereign’s war. But if that war was not just, the 
reasons poorly articulated, or the logic not understandable, sov-
ereigns risked losing the manpower and tax revenue necessary to 
fuel it—and thus risked losing their war, too. 
Rulers were concerned about their legitimacy, in other words, 
because even absolute monarchs require the acquiescence and 
support of their populations in order to successfully wage war. 
Sovereigns do not merely threaten their subjects to motivate 
them to obey. They claim legitimacy: the right to rule. Because 
they claim the right to rule, they also claim the right to punish 
violations of legal obligations. Sovereigns who lose their legiti-
macy, therefore, lose their right to rule and, potentially, their 
ability to motivate their subjects to obey. 
The manifestos indicate that sovereigns were conscious of 
their civilian audience in their drafting. Sovereigns used manifes-
tos to rally domestic support in two common ways: (1) through 
persuading the population of the just nature of the cause, and 
(2) through expressing empathy concerning the costs that citizens 
would bear through involvement in the conflict. 
In the French Wars of Religion, Henry III of France issued a 
manifesto that exemplifies the first technique. He explicitly ad-
dresses his citizen audience and offers an explanation for issuing 
the manifesto: he describes having “put ourselves in the fields and 
returned to our army, to explain in person” the reasons for going 
to war.115 Almost like a fireside chat, the manifesto thus serves as 
a means to personally and more informally address subjects on 
an individualized basis. Henry says that he hopes these personal 
accountings will “by our presence [ ] excite our good and joyous 
subjects to join us in assisting and accompanying us in such a holy 
and necessary occasion, as the one that presents itself.”116 He also 
makes the reason for these appeals to the population explicit by 
 
 115 Déclaration du Roy, par Laquelle Il Défend de Lever Gens de Guerre sans Son Ad-
veu, Authorité, Mande a Tous Des Subjects Catholicques de L’aller Trouver en Son Armee 
(1577), archived at http://perma.cc/RAH3-QAYT. 
 116 Id. 
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“command[ing] all his Catholic subjects to come meet him in his 
army.”117 
The second means of rallying domestic support—empathizing 
with the hardships experienced by the population—can be seen in 
the manifesto of Louis XVIII and Ferdinand VII, the kings of France 
and Spain, respectively. In their manifesto, Louis and Ferdinand 
express empathy with their subjects, conveying a sense of their 
understanding of the costs that their war efforts would exact on 
their citizens. “I am certain,” the monarchs wrote, “that my sub-
jects are confident that a King who has founded his happiness on 
that of his people cannot undertake the war without real pain.”118 
Through acknowledging the costs that citizens would bear, the 
sovereigns make an argument for their own good judgment. Be-
cause they are emotionally affected by burdens on their citizens, 
whatever costs their citizens bear, the sovereigns will bear as 
well. The argument implies that the sovereign has factored in the 
cost of civilian burdens in his decision to go to war and has nev-
ertheless determined that going to war is just and necessary. 
D. Gaining Support from Allies 
Sovereigns needed support not only from their own popula-
tions; they also often hoped for assistance from other states (or, 
at the very least, hoped to discourage others from joining the fight 
on the other side). 
All manifestos that were made public were intended to be 
read by other sovereign states. But some even directly addressed 
them, arguing that the other state should form an alliance with the 
manifesto-issuing state. In the War of the Portuguese Succession, 
for instance, Dom Antonio issued a manifesto against the King of 
Castile. The manifesto makes explicit that his only enemy was 
Castile, and his only goal was to reclaim territory he believed had 
been wrongly taken from the Kingdom of Portugal. Antonio in-
vited foreign kingdoms to join him in his crusade against the King 
of Castile, welcoming any alliances to that end: 
“It is for this reason . . . that we have caused this to be pub-
lished where we have power, and have ordered a copy to be 
sent to the foreign kingdoms and maritime republics, to hear 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Déclaration du Roi de France, Addresée au Peuple Français, Suivie du Manifeste 
de Ferdinand VII, Roi d’Espagne, Publié à l’Occasion de la Guerre contre Buonaparte 
(June 22, 1815), archived at http://perma.cc/L8QH-SER8. 
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what was said above, and to entreat them, rather, to aid us, 
and to favor us in our right over the King of Castile, the 
usurper of our kingdoms, and the enemy of all Christendom.119 
Persuading third parties was particularly important because 
classical international law released allies from the duty to aid bel-
ligerents who fought for unjust causes.120 The casus foederis al-
ways depended on the casus belli. Manifestos aimed to make it 
difficult for allies to wriggle out of their legal obligations. 
Some manifestos instead pressed third parties to remain out 
of the conflict. In the Hessian War of 1528, the Bishop of Würzburg 
issued a manifesto explaining the armament and war effort 
against the imperial estates of the Holy Roman Empire. Though 
the manifesto begins by addressing the bishop’s own domestic au-
dience, roughly twenty pages into the document, the manifesto 
explicitly calls on other nobles within the Holy Roman Empire not 
to engage in the war effort: “[W]e direct our kindest and most cor-
dial plea to each and every one of you,” the bishop pleads, “not to 
provide—yourselves or through your folks—any help, support or 
encouragement for them or any of their folks in their aggression 
against us and our estates.”121 
* * * 
As this Part has shown, manifestos served myriad purposes: 
averting war through settlement, assuaging the sovereign’s own 
conscience, rallying domestic support, and obtaining support from 
allies.122 But in order to effectively serve those purposes, the mani-
festos had to be convincing. And to be convincing, they had to offer 
reasons that the many audiences for the manifestos would find 
 
 119 Sommaire Déclaration des Justes Causes Et Raison Qui Ont Meu & Meuvent le 
Treshault & Trespuissant Prince Dom Anthoine Roy de Portugal, des Algarbes, & C. de 
Faire, & de Continuer la Guerre, Tant par Mer que par Terre, au Roy de Castille, & a tous 
Ceux Qui Luy Donnent & Donneront Faueur, & Ayde en Quelque Manière que Ce Soit 7 
(1582), archived at http://perma.cc/E3SF-HALC. 
 120 See, for example, Grotius, Law of War and Peace 2.25.4 at 581 (cited in note 6) 
(“[S]uch agreements cannot be stretched to include wars for which no just cause exists.”). 
See also Vattel, Law of Nations 2.12.168 at 197 (cited in note 6) (“The justice of the cause 
is another ground of preference between two allies. We ought even to refuse assistance to 
the one whose cause is unjust, whether he be at war with one of our allies, or with another 
state.”). 
 121 See Anfenglicher Handel (1528), archived at http://perma.cc/6V9J-23ZJ. 
 122 James Whitman argues that eighteenth-century manifestos served the purpose of 
turning warriors into litigators and thus contributed to civilizing war. See Whitman, Verdict 
of Battle at 128–39 (cited in note 9). 
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legitimate—or “just.” We thus turn in the next Part to an exami-
nation of those reasons—what were just causes for war? 
IV.  JUST CAUSES OF WAR 
We examined the collection of manifestos with the help of an 
outstanding multilingual team of research assistants. Each man-
ifesto was read carefully by a research assistant in the language 
in which it was written—languages that included Classical Chi-
nese, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, Latin, Ottoman 
Turkish, Portuguese, and Spanish. As each team member read 
each manifesto, he or she recorded the reasons it gave for going 
to war (referred to as “coding” the manifesto). This process often 
involved multiple rounds of coding over the course of three years 
because the coding scheme evolved as we learned what reasons 
were commonly offered. The team also met together on a weekly 
basis to discuss new and interesting discoveries (such as, early 
on, the practice of exchanging manifestos and counter-manifes-
tos) and to jointly determine how best to resolve any ambiguities 
(for example, over whether a particular claim was, indeed, a bal-
ance of power claim). 
What we discovered in the course of this process is, to our 
eyes, shocking. A twenty-first-century leader could not justify his 
decision to go to war on the basis of the excessive prices charged 
to his entourage during a state visit to Riga, as did Peter the 
Great in 1700.123 Similarly, twenty-first-century leaders cannot 
declare war on their neighbors for permitting the publication of 
libelous material concerning their persons, though Frederick III 
of Denmark did just that in 1657.124 These offenses would be en-
tirely illegitimate reasons for war today, but they, and others like 
them, were considered just causes for hundreds of years. Here we 
show how different the world once looked by describing the causes 
that were most prominently and consistently offered by sover-
eigns in the manifestos collection. The justifications found in our 
collection of 1,374 just war claims made in 332 manifestos and 
counter-manifestos (that is, excluding quasi-manifestos) in-
cluded, in order of frequency in which they appeared: self-defense 
(240 claims, or 17.5 percent of just war claims in the manifestos 
in our collection); violation of treaty obligations (n=170, 12.4 
 
 123 See Declaration de Guerre, in 2 Memoires du Regne de Pierre le Grand, Empereur 
de Russie 388–90 (Wetsteins & Smith 1729), archived at http://perma.cc/D57R-3HGZ. 
 124 See Jus Feciale Armatae Daniae 5 (1657), archived at http://perma.cc/32LB-6ZJA. 
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percent); tortious wrongs (n=150, 10.9 percent); protecting the 
balance of power (n=108, 7.9 percent); enforcement of inheritance 
rights (n=93, 6.8 percent); religious claims (n=91, 6.6 percent); 
protection of trade interests (n=70, 5.1 percent); humanitarian 
protection (n=63, 4.6 percent); protection of diplomatic relations 
(n=53, 3.9 percent); and debt collection (n=17, 1.2 percent). Other 
causes accounted for a total of 171 just war claims, some 12.4 per-
cent of the entire collection of claims in the manifestos. In addition, 
a number of manifestos included declarations of independence 
(n=7, 0.5 percent) or included references to the laws of war, law of 
nations, or customary international law (n=141, 10.3 percent). 
We discuss each cause in turn, offering examples to give tex-
ture to the categories. For readers interested in reading more, the 
database, including all of the data as well as links to many origi-
nal manifestos, is available in our War Manifestos Database.125 
A. Self-Defense 
States often argued that another state’s use of force on their 
territory (including an attack on a port, a skirmish at the border, 
or a full-scale invasion) justified the resort to war against the of-
fending state. (Notably, this just cause for war is the only one 
commonly given in manifestos that remains valid today, though 
its scope differs.) Of the just war claims made in the manifestos 
in our collection, 240 were self-defense claims, constituting 17.5 
percent of all claims and 72.3 percent of all manifestos. Of the 240 
manifestos containing self-defense claims, 135 (56.2 percent of 
self-defense manifestos, or 40.6 percent of all manifestos) identified 
this reason as the manifesto’s primary justification. Self-defense 
was by far the most popular category of just war claims. Over the 
course of the period studied, it steadily grew in popularity.126 
For example, in 1596, during the Anglo-Spanish War, the Earl 
of Essex issued a manifesto on behalf of Queen Elizabeth I, primar-
ily claiming self-defense and warning the King of Spain that it 
would be the solemn duty of the English army to increase its num-
bers in order to ward off Spanish invasion from all sides.127 Simi-
larly, the governors of the Austrian Netherlands issued a manifesto 
against France in 1792, claiming that the French Revolution and the 
 
 125 Hathaway, et al, War Manifestos Database (cited in note 23). 
 126 See Figures 4, 5, and 6 for graphical representations of the change in frequency of 
just war claims over time. 
 127 See Déclaration des Causes Qui Ont Meu la Royne d’Angleterre, À Déclarer la 
Guerre au Roy d’Espagne (1596), archived at http://perma.cc/N3YQ-8CFT. 
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instability it had unleashed threatened their provinces’ safety.128 
Consequently, Marie Christine of Austria-Hungary and Bohemia 
and Albert-Casimir, Prince Royal of Poland and Lithuania, who 
had become governors of the Austrian Netherlands in 1780, 
vowed to “carefully attend to the defence of those provinces.”129 
B. Violation of a Treaty Obligation 
The violation of a treaty obligation was a just cause for war. 
Of the just war claims made in the manifestos in our collection, 
170 were treaty violation claims, constituting 12.4 percent of all 
claims and contained in 51.2 percent of all manifestos. Of the 170 
manifestos containing treaty claims, 40 (23.5 percent, or 12.0 per-
cent of all manifestos) identified this reason as the manifesto’s 
primary justification. As shown in Figure 5, violations of a treaty 
obligation as a justification for war rises to roughly 60 percent of 
all treaties in the middle of the eighteenth century before gradu-
ally falling back off. 
Manifestos containing reference to violations of treaty obliga-
tions tended to have particularly condemnatory language. In 
1657, the king of Denmark issued a scathing manifesto announc-
ing war against Sweden and its king, Charles Gustavus. The king 
of Denmark presented the Swedish sovereign’s violations of the 
second treaty of Brömsebro as one of his primary justifications for 
going to war. “We are heartily sorry that these firm beginnings of 
Peace at Bremsebroa [sic], by which the publike quiet of the North 
was so strengthened,” the king of Denmark remarked, “being so 
farre remov’d from their sight and minds should be so shaken, 
and that our Royall Authority should be so immodestly contemn’d 
and neglected.”130 
In the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, Great Britain issued a mani-
festo against the States General of the Netherlands. George III al-
leged that the Netherlands had breached the Perpetual Defensive 
Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at 
Westminster on March 3, 1678. “In direct and open Violation of 
Treaty,” George explained, the Netherlands had “suffered an 
American Pirate to remain several Weeks in one of their Ports; 
and even permitted a Part of his Crew to mount Guard in a Fort 
 
 128 Manifesto of the Government of Bruxelles, in Answer to the Declaration of War on 
the Part of France at 1 (cited in note 66). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Jus Feciale Armatae Daniae at 3 (cited in note 124). 
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in the Texel.”131 George quoted directly from the treaty: “There 
shall be a firm, inviolable and universal Peace, and sincere 
Friendship.”132 But now, George declared, they “not only avow the 
whole Transaction, but glory in it, and expressly say, even to the 
States General, that what they did ‘was what their indispensable 
Duty required.’”133 George vowed, “There is an End of the Faith of 
all Treaties with them, if Amsterdam may usurp the Sovereign 
Power, may violate those Treaties with Impunity, by pledging the 
States to Engagements directly contrary.”134 George added, 
An Infraction of the Law of Nations, by the meanest Member 
of any Country, gives the injured State a Right to demand 
Satisfaction and Punishment:–How much more so, when the 
Injury complained of is a flagrant Violation of Public Faith, 
committed by leading and predominant Members in the 
State?135 
C. Tortious Wrongs: Injuries to Property or Life 
Manifestos frequently pointed to tortious wrongs—injuries to 
property or life, including injuries to the issuing sovereign and to 
its citizens. (Tortious wrongs thus differ from humanitarian jus-
tifications, which focus instead on harms to the property or life of 
others.) Of the just war claims made in the manifestos in our col-
lection, 150 were tort claims, constituting 10.9 percent of all 
claims and 45.2 percent of all manifestos. Of the 150 manifestos 
containing tort claims, 21 (14.0 percent, or 6.3 percent of all man-
ifestos) identified this reason as the manifesto’s primary justifi-
cation. Tortious wrongs were common reasons for war through 
the mid-1800s, at which point they fell off precipitously.136 
To take one example, in 1652, the States General of the 
Netherlands issued a manifesto against England in the course of 
the First Anglo-Dutch War, outlining in great detail the “torts 
which had been done” by English “brigadeers” against Dutch 
traders on the high seas: 
 
 131 Manifesto, George R (Dec 21, 1780), archived at http://perma.cc/SEV7-NFQ3. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id, quoting Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and The 
Netherlands (1678). 
 134 Manifesto, George R (cited in note 131). 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Figure 5. 
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They have rushed from all parts of the vessels our good sub-
jects, even the Government Officers, as though they were pi-
rates; they have exercised their brigadeering against all oth-
ers, throwing themselves upon our ships in the sea, as on 
those of their enemies; they have attacked [our ships]; they 
have taken them; they have brought them in; they have pil-
laged their loads and the merchandise they carried, ill-
treated our pilots and crew, without even our ambassadors 
ever having given them the authority to give orders, much 
less to make our good subjects subject to what had been per-
petrated against them by violence, and to repair the torts 
which had been done to them by theirs.137 
There is even a reference to a tort in the manifesto’s title,138 em-
phasizing that the numerous British infringements on Dutch life 
and property constituted one of the primary justifications for go-
ing to war. 
Tort claims could cover a wide range of actions, including in-
sults to the sovereign’s honor, slander, and even kidnapping, 
whether of the sovereign himself or his relations. This required 
us to make fine distinctions. There is a real difference between a 
general appeal to uphold the nation’s honor as a way of rallying 
support for a war and a sovereign who chooses to go to war be-
cause another insulted him by refusing to greet him with the cus-
tomary forms befitting his imperial dignity. The latter is a tort 
claim; the former is rhetoric. 
D. Protecting the Balance of Power 
Protecting the balance of power was another reason for war 
frequently offered in manifestos. States argued that concentra-
tion of power among threatening alliances, the specter of a uni-
versal monarchy, or aggressive actions by other states upset the 
delicate balance of power among states in Europe. Of the just war 
claims made in the manifestos in our collection, 108 were balance 
 
 137 Manifeste ou Declaration, des Hauts & Puissants Seigneurs les Estats Generaux 
des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas, Contenant Une Vraye Relation de la Sincerité des Inten-
tions Qu’ils Ont Cües, & des Justes Procedures, Qu’ils Ont Tenues, en Ce Qui S’est Passé 
au Traitté entre Eux & les Ambassadeurs Extraordinaires & Deputez de Eux Qui Gou-
vernent à Present l’Angleterre, Tant Icy a la Haye, Que depuis a Londres. Comme Aussi Des 
Injustes & Violentes Procedures de Ceux Dudit Gouvernement, Qui Ont Contraint lesdits 
Seigneurs Estats a Garantir par la Voye de Retorsion leur Estat & Leur Sujets des Torts & 
des Outrages Qu’il Exercent 12 (1652), archived at http://perma.cc/8K4Q-C7XB. 
 138 See generally id. 
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of power claims, constituting 7.9 percent of all claims and 32.5 
percent of all manifestos. Of the 108 manifestos containing bal-
ance of power claims, 27 (25.0 percent, or 8.1 percent of all mani-
festos) identified this reason as the manifesto’s primary justifica-
tion. As shown in Figure 5, protecting the balance of power gained 
in popularity as a justification for war from the early 1600s to the 
late 1700s, then fell off. 
The Nine Years’ War (1688–1697) tested the precarious bal-
ance of power in Europe. In 1689, King Louis XIV of France, 
threatened by a budding alliance between the Spanish, Austrians, 
British, and Dutch, vowed to “waste no time in preventing [the 
Spanish king’s] evil designs” to “join with his enemies,” a prospect 
that would disrupt the delicate balance that had been laboriously 
attained just ten years prior in the Franco-Dutch War.139 Louis 
thus “resolved to declare War against [Spain] by Sea as well as by 
Land.”140 
Balance of power was also raised in a manifesto issued in the 
course of the Second Partition of Poland. Frederick William II of 
Prussia issued a manifesto to the City of Danzig (modern-day 
Gdańsk) in 1793, justifying Prussian occupation of Poland in order 
“to keep it within its proper bounds, and to take care of the safety 
and tranquility of the neighbouring provinces of Prussia.”141 
Defensive counter-manifestos, aiming to downplay the 
claimed threats to European tranquility in the original manifesto 
as exaggerated and overblown, frequently offered rebuttals to bal-
ance of power claims. For instance, the Hapsburgs issued a coun-
ter-manifesto against France in defense of their ally Spain during 
the Franco-Spanish War.142 The 1635 counter-manifesto ridiculed 
French attempts to raise the specter of universal monarchy to jus-
tify war against Spain: “What has been sung so often in all the 
libels of France, that which is repeated several times in its Man-
ifesto, is that the design of the Spaniard is to subject the Empire 
 
 139 See Ordonnance du Roy de France Portant Declaration de Guerre par Mer et par 
Terre, contre Les Espagnols; Qui Revoque les Passeports, Sauvegardes, & Saufconduits; 
Fait Deffence D’avoir Aucun Commerce, & Enjoint à Ses Sujets de Courresus aux Espagnols 
(1689), online at http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/resolve/display/bsb11063887.html 
(visited Apr 27, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Manifesto and Declaration of his Prussian Majesty to the City of Dantzick (1793), 
archived at http://perma.cc/C82A-JHQE. 
 142 See generally Manifeste pour la Iustice des Armes de la Tres Auguste Maison 
D’Austriche: Ensemble la Response à Celuy Qui a Este Publie Sous le Nom du Roy de 
France (1635), archived at http://perma.cc/TQM3-7R3F. 
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to the House of Austria in the form of a perpetual Monarchy.”143 
The Hapsburgs later called the purported “threat” of universal 
monarchy by the Spanish as “the ordinary scarecrow that is made 
to frighten children and weak minds.”144 
E. Enforcement of Inheritance Rights 
Manifestos often referenced the enforcement of inheritance 
laws, succession rules, and other hereditary rights to justify war. 
Of the just war claims in the manifestos in our collection, ninety-
three were coded as citing the enforcement of inheritance law, 
succession rules, and other hereditary rights as a reason for going 
to war, constituting 6.8 percent of all claims and 28.0 percent of 
all manifestos. Of the ninety-three manifestos containing inher-
itance claims, forty-two (45.2 percent, or 12.7 percent of all man-
ifestos) identified this reason as the manifesto’s primary justifi-
cation. 
Most typically, this category of manifestos contained compet-
ing claims of two potential successors to a throne. In 1582, for 
example, Dom Antonio issued a manifesto against the King of 
Castile in the War of the Portuguese Succession over the right to 
the Portuguese throne.145 A significant number of manifestos also 
contained retaliatory claims for violations of succession procedure 
(including election laws). For instance, a manifesto issued during 
the 1703–1711 revolt against Hapsburg rule on behalf of Francis II 
Rákóczi asserted that the Hapsburgs had interfered with Hun-
gary’s traditional rights and privileges, including that of electing 
their own king.146 Some manifestos even asserted the hereditary 
claims of others (usually family members or allies) as a justifica-
tion for going to war. During the Italian War of 1536–1538, 
Charles V, King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, asserted his 
and his son’s hereditary rights against King Francis I of France.147 
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the enforcement of inheritance 
rights as a just war claim was more frequently observed in earlier 
 
 143 Id at 37. 
 144 Id at 30. 
 145 See generally Sommaire Déclaration (cited in note 119). 
 146 See Manifeste des Mecontents de Hongrie, Contenat les Raisons Qu’ils Prétendent 
Avoir de S’être Soulevez, & de Prendre les Armes contre l’Empereur pour Maintenir leur 
Loix & Liberty (1705), archived at http://perma.cc/JY2W-7V5C. 
 147 See La replique faicte par Lempereur sur la dicte response, du Roy de France (cited 
in note 45). 
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manifestos and sharply declined at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. 
F. Religious Claims 
Two separate forms of religious claims were commonly made 
in manifestos. First, there were claims surrounding the protection 
of religious liberty. States argued that people should have the 
freedom to practice their own religion. Second, manifestos cited 
defending the one true church or religion as a reason for war. 
Counting the claims together, of the just war claims made in the 
manifestos in our collection, ninety-one were religious claims, 
constituting 6.6 percent of all claims and contained in 27.4 per-
cent of all manifestos. Of the ninety-one manifestos containing 
religious claims, seventeen (18.7 percent, or 5.1 percent of all 
manifestos) identified this reason as the manifesto’s primary jus-
tification. Religious justifications for war were common early in 
the period studied but fell in popularity steadily throughout.148 
The first type of religious claim can be found in the 1702 man-
ifesto issued by the Netherlands against the kings of France and 
Spain. The Netherlands argued that it had an obligation to “pro-
tect[ ] our subjects and [ ] preserve[ ] their Religion and Lib-
erty.”149 Therefore, the manifesto says, the Netherlands will “take 
up Arms against the said Kings of France and Spain.”150 
The second type of religious claim is present in a 1587 Decla-
ration by French sovereign Henry III. In his “Declaration of the 
King, by which he forbids the levying of men of arms without his 
approval and authority, and commands all his Catholic subjects 
to come to find him in his army,” Henry calls on the support of his 
Catholic subjects in defense of the one true church, saying his 
manifesto is addressed 
to the benefit of those who have opposed themselves by arms 
against the execution of our last Edict, which we have made 
in order to reunite all our subjects to the Catholic, Apostolic 
and Roman religion, against whom we have thought to em-
ploy even our own person, so as to cause God to be served.151 
 
 148 See Figure 5. 
 149 A Manifesto: Containing the Reasons Which Have Induced the Lords States General 
of the United Netherlands, to Declare War against the Kings of France and Spain 13 (May 
8, 1702) (A. Baldwin 1702), archived at http://perma.cc/TS2S-VWB9. 
 150 Id at 13–14. 
 151 Declaration du Roy at 5–6 (cited in note 115). 
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As with tort claims, religious claims sometimes forced us to 
make fine distinctions. Manifesto practice, as with the exercise of 
sovereignty generally during the period under study (and 
throughout human history), was intimately bound up with reli-
gious faith and observance. Kings claimed to rule by the grace of 
God, and they naturally invoked God’s protection when they took 
up arms. These more general religious references were as plenti-
ful and pro forma in war manifestos as they are in contemporary 
presidential addresses, but they do not qualify as causes for war. 
G. Protection of Trade Interests 
States considered protection of trade interests a just cause of 
going to war. Arguments in favor of protection of trade interests 
ranged from retribution for other states’ disruption of trade chan-
nels to their interference with a sovereign’s commerce. Of the just 
war claims made in the manifestos in our collection, seventy were 
trade claims, constituting 5.1 percent of all claims and 21.1 per-
cent of all manifestos. Of the seventy manifestos containing trade 
claims, fourteen (20.0 percent, or 4.2 percent of all manifestos) 
identified this reason as the manifesto’s primary justification. 
The justification grew in popularity through the mid-1600s before 
gradually falling off, as shown in Figure 5. 
Throughout history, violations of trade interests on the open 
seas have invariably served as justification for war. In 1523, the 
Hanseatic State of Lübeck primarily justified the Swedish War of 
Succession against Denmark’s King Christian with evidence of 
Danish harassment of Lübeckian ships and threats to the 
Hanseatic city’s commercial interests.152 A century later, during 
the Torstenson War, Queen Christina of Sweden likewise based 
her just war claim against Denmark on the Danish confiscation 
of Swedish ships and attacks against traders.153 Trade interests 
inflamed British passions during the Nine Years’ War, as evi-
denced by William III’s 1689 manifesto against France.154 By al-
lowing private Frenchmen to seize English ships and charging ex-
orbitant import taxes on British goods, France was said to have 
as its ulterior design the “annihilation of commerce, and conse-
quently, Ruin of Navigation, whence depends a great part of the 
 
 152 See Wie die von Luebeck (1523), archived at http://perma.cc/PZY8-A6ZF. 
 153 Wiederlegung und Wolgegründete Antwort Auff Das Danische Manifest (1644), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9MU7-S39R. 
 154 See Declaration de Guerre de sa Majeste Britanique contre le Roy des François 
(May 17, 1689), archived at http://perma.cc/N543-XM59. 
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prosperity and happiness of [the British] nation”—an act that “is 
so manifest, there is no need to repeat” all the specific instances 
of France’s trade-violating conduct.155 Yet Britain, too, would in 
turn face its share of trade claims by France. During the American 
Revolution, France issued a manifesto detailing England’s myr-
iad trade violations,156 ranging from “crowding the seas with pri-
vateers” to “disturbing of his Majesty’s subjects in their trade and 
navigation, under the most absurd pretences” and “the assuming 
of a tyrannic empire over the seas.”157 
H. Humanitarian Protection 
Today we think of humanitarian intervention as a modern 
invention.158 But during the period when manifestos were issued, 
humanitarian protection was frequently cited as a reason for war. 
In making these claims, states argued that harms to the property 
or life of others—including citizens of other states or a religious 
minority in another state—justified military intervention. Hu-
manitarian interventions were often made in retribution for 
atrocities committed against Christians. Of the just war claims 
made in the manifestos in our collection, sixty-three made claims 
of humanitarian intervention, constituting 4.6 percent of all 
claims and contained in 19.0 percent of all manifestos. Of the 
sixty-three manifestos containing humanitarian claims, twelve 
(19.0 percent, or 3.6 percent of all manifestos) identified this rea-
son as the manifesto’s primary justification. This justification for 
war remained fairly steady at inclusion in just under 20 percent 
of manifestos throughout the period studied, as Figure 5 shows. 
An early humanitarian intervention claim appears in the 
1585 declaration from the Queen of England to her citizens. Is-
sued during the Anglo-Spanish war, the manifesto stated that the 
queen was going to war to protect citizens in the Low Countries 
from the hostilities of Spain. (The English queen had been sup-
porting the Dutch Protestants, who were seeking independence 
from Catholic Spain. Her motives were not entirely selfless, of 
 
 155 See id at 2. 
 156 See A Manifesto, Displaying the Motives and Conduct of His Most Christian Maj-
esty towards England (cited in note 66). 
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 158 For recent dissents, see Fabian Klose, ed, The Emergence of Humanitarian Inter-
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course. She feared that Spanish reconquest could affect the bal-
ance of power, and she cited this reason along with several other 
just causes.) The queen first explained that, though sovereigns 
are “not bounde to yeeld account or render the reasons of their 
actions to any others but to God their only Soveraigne Lord,” she 
felt “specially mooved, for divers reasons hereafter briefly remem-
bred, to publish not onely to our owne naturall loving Subjectes, 
but also to all others our neighbours, specially to such Princes and 
States as are our Confederates, or have for their Subjectes cause 
of commerce with our Countreis and people.”159 The people of the 
Low Countries, she argued, merited England’s assistance because 
of the “long warres and persecutions of strange Nations there, 
lamentablie afflicted, and in present danger to bee brought into a 
perpetuall servitude.”160 
I. Protection of Diplomatic Relations 
States argued that they had the right to go to war in order to 
protect their diplomatic relations. This meant going to war both 
on the basis of retribution for interference with a sovereign’s dip-
lomatic interactions with other states, as well as retribution for 
harm to a sovereign’s diplomatic personnel or property. Of the 
just war claims made in the manifestos in our collection, fifty-
three were diplomatic relation claims, constituting 3.9 percent of 
all claims and 16.0 percent of all manifestos. Of the fifty-three 
manifestos containing diplomatic claims, three manifestos (5.7 
percent, or 0.9 percent of all manifestos) identified this reason as 
the manifesto’s primary justification. Figure 5 shows that protec-
tion of diplomatic relations was a commonly cited cause of war in 
the early modern period, but it gradually declined as a cited jus-
tification throughout the period studied. 
In 1741, for instance, Sweden’s Frederick I issued a mani-
festo against Czar Ivan VI of Russia during the Russo-Swedish 
War, alleging that the murder of Malcom Stewart, a Swedish am-
bassador, was one of the primary justifications for going to war.161 
Protection of diplomatic relations took on a slightly different fla-
vor during World War II, when the failure of a nation to abide by 
 
 159 A Declaration of the Causes Moving the Queene of England to Give Aide to the 
Defence of the People Afflicted and Oppressed in the Lowe Countries 1 (Barker 1585), ar-
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 161 See generally Jhro Königlichen Majestat in Schweden Publication den Krieg wider 
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diplomatic protocol was proffered not to justify war, but rather to 
persuade that nation’s subjects to withdraw support for their gov-
ernment. In a quasi-manifesto broadcast to the German people, 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain chastised German 
withdrawal of an offer of peace to Poland merely two hours after 
first extending it.162 Earlier, he noted, a Polish representative was 
asked to sign an agreement with the Nazi government without 
having even read it.163 Given these and other methods, Chamberlain 
clearly and forcefully laid out Germany’s violation of diplomatic 
protocol at the end of his broadcast: “This is not negotiation. This 
is a dictate. To such methods no self-respecting and powerful 
State could assent.”164 
J. Collection of Debts 
Manifestos sometimes referenced unpaid debts as a reason 
for going to war. Sovereigns implied that the war would either be 
retributive (punishing the debtor state) or restorative (serving as 
a means of collecting debt through plunder). Of the just war 
claims made in our collection, seventeen were debt claims, consti-
tuting 1.2 percent of all claims and 5.1 percent of all manifestos. 
Of the seventeen manifestos containing debt claims, none identi-
fied this reason as the primary justification. No more than 10 per-
cent of manifestos contained this justification in a given period.165 
In 1528, for example, an English emissary named Clarenciao 
issued a manifesto on behalf of Henry VIII against the Holy Roman 
Empire with regard to the Hapsburg-Valois Wars.166 Among vari-
ous other claims, Clarenciao points to an unpaid loan issued by 
King Henry VIII to Emperor Charles V.167 Similarly, the Siege of 
Stralsund (1711–1715) was caused, in part, by Russia and Poland’s 
need to collect an outstanding debt of £800,000 as compensation 
 
 162 See Neville Chamberlain, Broadcast by the British Prime Minister to the German 
People (Sept 3, 1939), in The Outbreak of War: 22nd August–3rd September 1939 20–21 
(Ministry of Information 1939), archived at http://perma.cc/XP8U-MNAU. 
 163 See id at 21. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See Figure 5. 
 166 See Abclag Beder Konigen von Frankreichen une Engeland (Stockel 1528), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/XU2Z-7MD7. 
 167 See id at 6–7. It was not only lender nations that invoked collection of debts as a 
just war claim. In a quasi-manifesto dated 1739, Spain explained its reasons for refusing 
to pay a £95,000 indemnification for the Spanish capture of English traders. See His 
Catholick Majesty’s Manifesto, Justifying His Conduct in Relation to the Late Convention 
with His Reasons for Not Paying the Ninety-Five Thousand Pounds (Amey 1739), archived 
at http://perma.cc/UA2K-LTY9. 
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for Sweden’s century-long occupation of Stettin (modern-day 
Szczecin, Poland).168 
K. Declaration of Independence 
Our coding uncovered support for an independence move-
ment as another just cause of war in traditional manifestos, as 
well as several direct declarations of independence issued by fac-
tions seeking independence.169 The documents in this latter group 
are, by nature, generally quasi-manifestos, rather than full-
fledged manifestos, because they usually are not issued by a sov-
ereign.170 Many of the quasi-manifestos that fell into this category 
nevertheless exemplified the manifesto-like practice of justifying 
their resort to war to an intended audience of both the sovereign 
from whom independence is sought as well as a wider public au-
dience. In total, the manifesto collection includes seven manifes-
tos citing independence as a just war claim, as well as seventeen 
quasi-manifestos with direct declaration of independence claims 
(out of a total number of fifty-three quasi-manifestos). The seven 
independence claims in manifestos represent 0.5 percent of all 
claims and 2.1 percent of all manifestos.171 Two manifestos listed 
it as a primary justification for war, constituting 11.8 percent of 
manifestos citing declaration of independence and 0.6 percent of 
all manifestos. 
One familiar example, of course, is the American Declaration 
of Independence. That declaration exhorts that “a decent respect 
to the opinions of mankind requires that [people seeking independ-
ence] should declare the causes which impel them to the separa-
tion.”172 France’s manifesto upon joining the colonists’ war effort 
also cites independence as a just war claim.173 Elsewhere, declara-
tions of independence were also made in quasi-manifestos issued 
by the Brabantine people against Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II 
 
 168 See Motifs Qui Ont Engagé Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse 1, 8 (1715), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R7A6-JJRB. 
 169 Coders were instructed to code declarations of independence as manifestos if the 
independence movement was successful and as quasi-manifestos if they were not. 
 170 Some declarations of independence were issued by sovereigns who had, for one 
reason or another, come under the dominance of or whose territory had been occupied by 
another sovereign. 
 171 The number of manifestos in this category was too small to generate a figure like 
those for the other categories. 
 172 US Declaration of Independence ¶ 1 (1776). 
 173 See A Manifesto, Displaying the Motives and Conduct of His Most Christian Maj-
esty towards England (cited in note 66). 
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during the 1789 Brabantine Revolution,174 as well as by Irish re-
bels against England during the 1803 Irish Rebellion.175 
The practice of declaring independence in a document pro-
fessing to be a manifesto is indicative of the importance placed on 
manifestos as sovereign legal instruments. Only sovereigns had 
the right to wage war, and manifestos were the means by which 
they asserted and exercised that right. When a rebel group at-
tempted to issue a manifesto, it was making a claim that it, too, 
was a legitimate sovereign actor and thereby elevated its quest 
for independence from mere banditry to the dignity of war. One 
intriguing example of this practice was the “manifesto” issued by 
the Confederate Congress in 1864 during the US Civil War.176 
This quasi-manifesto looks remarkably like the manifestos that 
were common a century earlier—in fact, it is the last document in 
the collection to assert hereditary claims as a basis for war—and 
even calls itself a “manifesto,” a term that Americans had until 
then largely avoided because of its monarchical overtones. One 
might almost say that the Confederate manifesto was a little too 
perfect, as though, like any parvenu, the Confederacy wanted so 
desperately to fit in that it tried too hard and overshot the mark. 
L. References to Laws of War, Law of Nations, or Customary 
International Law 
In war manifestos, sovereigns frequently referred to the laws 
of war, the law of nations, or customary international law. Of the 
332 manifestos from our collection, 141 referenced these laws, 
constituting 42.5 percent of all manifestos. The number of mani-
festos expressly citing the laws of war, the law of nations, or cus-
tomary international law remained high throughout the period 
studied—at roughly 40 percent of all manifestos issued. (Because 
the law of nations was not, strictly speaking, a separate cause of 
war, but rather the overarching legal framework within which all 
such causes had to be articulated, we have not coded reference to 
the law of nations as a distinct just cause, and consequently it 
does not appear in Figure 5.) 
At times, however, sovereigns did point to violations of such 
laws as a justification for war. For instance, the 1739 War of 
 
 174 See Manifeste du Peuple Brabançon (1789), archived at http://perma.cc/U45T-XL53. 
 175 See Manifesto of the Irish Rebels: The Provisional Government to the People of Ireland 
(1803), archived at http://perma.cc/WRS5-DPM7. 
 176 See Manifesto of the Congress of the Confederate States of America Relative to the 
Existing War with the United States at 286–88 (cited in note 22). 
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Jenkins’ Ear between England and Spain was brought about by 
trade skirmishes between the two sovereigns on the open seas. In 
1739, England’s George II issued a declaration of war against 
Spain’s Phillip V, citing the Spaniards’ “many unjust Seizures . . . 
for several Years” as “contrary to the Treaties” between the two 
nations, as well as “to the Law of Nations.”177 George II specifi-
cally cites the “Liberty of Navigation” on an equal basis with a 
well-known tenet of the Law of Nations.178 Clearly, the law of na-
tions was intended to bolster King George’s justifications and 
place England squarely on the side of lawfulness and justice, with 
any wrongdoing that violated international custom to fall solely 
on Spain’s shoulders. Elsewhere, reference was also made to the 
“laws of war”: upon Prussia’s invasion of Austria during the First 
Silesian War, Frederick the Great of Prussia cites “the principles 
of necessary defense, permitted by the laws of every people” (that 
is, ius gentium) to justify his attack.179 
In other cases, references were made to the law of nations to 
support other claims, or even sometimes as a passing reference. 
For example, the prince regent of Portugal, in explaining why he 
did not fully comply with Napoleon’s demands, appealed to inter-
national law to justify his decision: 
The Court of Portugal . . . could not believe that the Court of 
the Tuileries would seriously make such proposals, which 
would compromise its honor and its dignity. . . . It tried to 
moderate the pretensions of the French Government by ac-
ceding to the closure of the ports but refusing the two other 
articles, which were contrary to the principles of Public Law 
and to the Treaties that existed between the two Nations.180 
Similarly, George III of Great Britain commanded his courts 
to apply international law: 
[T]he several Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty’s Do-
minions [shall] take Cognizance of, and judicially proceed 
upon all and all Manner of Captures, Seizures, Prizes, and 
 
 177 See His Majesty’s Declaration of War against the King of Spain (1739), in The London 
Gazette (Oct 20–23, 1739), archived at http://perma.cc/2WB2-AHHU. 
 178 See id. 
 179 See Patent, Wegen Des Ein-Marches Sr. Königl. Maiestät in Preussen Trouppen in 
das Hertzogthumb Schlesien (Nov 10, 1740), in Preussische Staatsschriften 67, 70 (Von 
Alexander Duncker 1877), online at http://books.google.com/books?id=HUguAAAAMAAJ& 
printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (visited Feb 18, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 180 See Manifeste, ou Exposé Raisonné, et Justificatif de la Conduite de la Cour de 
Portugal à l’Egard de la France (1808), archived at http://perma.cc/RZ6G-9TT8. 
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Reprisals of all Ships and Goods that are or shall be taken, 
and [shall] hear and determine the same; and, according to 
the Course of Admiralty, and the Laws of Nations, [shall] ad-
judge and condemn all such Ships, Vessels and Goods, as 
shall belong to the States General of the United Provinces.181 
M. Other Reasons 
Though these categories capture many of the reasons for go-
ing to war, the list above is not exhaustive. Manifestos sometimes 
contained other just causes for going to war. These include obey-
ing a papal command,182 negotiating in bad faith,183 and, because 
there is nothing new under the sun, interfering in the electoral 
process of another sovereign state.184 
N. Just Causes over Time 
Table 1 and Figures 5,185 6, and 7 show the just causes for war 
in parallel to allow for better comparisons across categories. 
Viewing the just causes in absolute and comparative terms over 
time allows us to see how the reasons given by sovereigns com-
pare both at any given moment and across time. A few aspects are 
particularly notable. First, self-defense is the most common rea-
son given for war, and it grows as a justification over time. That 
is notable given that self-defense remains a permissible justifica-
tion for states to unilaterally resort to force. But we should be 
careful about drawing the wrong lesson from history; as discussed 
in more detail in Part V.C, self-defense as a legal justification for 
 
 181 The King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council (Dec 20, 1780), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SEV7-NFQ3. 
 182 See, for example, Eyn Rede der gesandten Botschaffer der Vendiger an Maximili-
anum Gethane zu Memmingen (Dec 1, 1508), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8JZ-EL3K.  
 183 See, for example, Manifest von Ferdinand von Spanien (1636), in 3 Les Papiers de 
Richeliu, Section Politique Extérieure Correspondance et Papiers d’État 2–4 (Pedonde 
1999) (Anja Victorine Hartmann, ed). 
 184 See, for example, Les Armes du Roy Justifiées contre l’Apologie de la Cour de 
Vienne (1734), archived at http://perma.cc/P354-47QC. 
 185 The lines in Figure 5 represent a point estimate generated using a local polyno-
mial smoother, and the shaded area is the 95 percent confidence interval. Some might 
object that confidence intervals are not appropriate in cases in which one is working with 
a complete set. As noted earlier, while we do have the most extensive set of manifestos 
available, the set is not complete. Many manifestos have been lost or are inaccessible. We 
thus treat our collection as a sample of war manifestos. Hence, confidence intervals are 
appropriate and, indeed, important to signal the uncertainty inherent in the numbers pre-
sented. (The line generated with the local polynomial smoother can be seen as an in-
trasample prediction of war justifications.) 
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war in the war manifesto period was very broad. Modern resorts 
to self-defense, by contrast, are more narrowly cabined. Article 51 
of the UN Charter permits states to resort to force in self-defense 
in the face of an “armed attack”186—a much narrower range of cir-
cumstances than those that would have served as justification for 
war in the pre-Charter era. 
Second, several reasons that were common early on became 
much less so over time. These include protection of inheritance 
rights, religious claims, and interference with trade relations. 
These changes comport with historical trends: as absolute mon-
archy declined, so too did battles over inheritance rights to the 
crown. With the rise of religious heterogeneity, religious justifica-
tions likely had less appeal to populations and fellow sovereigns 
alike.187 The decline in conflicts generated by trade relations may 
be due, at least in part, to the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting 
Maritime Law, which was signed by most of the major powers and 
which abolished privateering, provided that neutral flags covered 
the enemy’s goods, provided that neutral goods were not liable to 
capture under the enemy’s flag, and regulated blockades.188 Per-
haps too the decline of the East India Company and the close of 
the Opium Wars had some effect. 
Third, aside from self-defense, common reasons given for 
waging war are reasons that today would be considered beyond 
the pale: treaty violations, tortious wrongs, and (early on) the en-
forcement of inheritance rights. In other words, many of the most 
common reasons for going to war during the period during which 
manifestos were issued—the late fifteenth century through the 
early twentieth century—would be considered absurd today. War 
was a tool used for a range of purposes utterly unfamiliar to mod-
ern eyes. 
The next Part explores a few of the lessons to be learned from 
the insights war manifestos offer us.  
 
 186 UN Charter Art 51. As noted above, the precise scope of this modern exception is 
a matter of some debate. See note 5. 
 187 See Part II.B. 
 188 See Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (Apr 16, 1856), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MV38-XZGA. The Hague Convention of 1907 further expanded some of 
these protections and may have made conflicts at sea even less likely. 
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TABLE 1:  JUST CAUSES REFERENCED IN MANIFESTOS 
Just Cause of War 
Percent of All 
Claims Made in 
Manifestos 





















(Out of 53) 
Self-Defense 17.5% 72.3% 40.7% 56.6% 
Violation of Treaty 
Obligations 
12.4% 51.2% 12.0% 28.3% 
Tortious Wrongs 10.9% 45.2% 6.3% 39.6% 
Protecting the 
Balance of Power 
7.9% 32.5% 8.1% 32.1% 
Enforcement of 
Inheritance Rights 
6.8% 28.0% 12.7% 43.4% 
Religious Claims 6.6% 27.4% 5.1% 43.4% 
Protection of Trade 
Interests 
5.1% 21.1% 4.2% 11.3% 
Humanitarian 
Protection 
4.6% 19.0% 3.6% 17.0% 
Protection of 
Diplomatic Relations 
3.9% 16.0% 0.6% 9.4% 
Debt Collection 1.2% 5.1% 0% 1.9% 
Declaration of 
Independence 
0.5% 2.1% 0.6% 32.1% 
References to Law of 
War, Law of Nations, 
or Customary 
International Law 
 42.5%  35.8% 
 
2018] War Manifestos 1203 
 
FIGURE 5:  JUST CAUSES REFERENCED IN MANIFESTOS OVER 
TIME 
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FIGURE 6:  ABSOLUTE OCCURRENCE OF JUST CAUSES IN 
MANIFESTOS OVER TIME 
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FIGURE 7:  RELATIVE OCCURRENCE OF JUST CAUSES IN 
MANIFESTOS 
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V.  WHAT WAR MANIFESTOS TEACH US ABOUT MODERN LEGAL 
DEBATES 
The very existence of war manifestos as part of a highly for-
malized and structured system of communication by sovereigns 
in the lead-up to, and conduct of, war is a valuable discovery in 
and of itself. Understanding the history of manifestos, the pur-
poses for which they were deployed, and the causes that sover-
eigns believed were just helps us to better map the legal and po-
litical world of the fifteenth to early-twentieth centuries. As 
already noted, manifestos offer a new lens with which to view the 
emergence of the independent sovereign state in Europe. We see 
in that evolution evidence that the sovereign state we take for 
granted today was consciously constructed in the period following 
the Reformation. We can also see how customary international 
law norms evolved over the course of five centuries. Understand-
ing this history helps us better understand our own international 
legal system, which is the result of this evolution. And it helps us 
better understand the vestiges of that system that we still see 
around us. 
But lawyers might ask why all this history matters. War 
manifestos, after all, are no longer issued. What can they teach 
us about the issues we wrestle with today? The answer is that 
war manifestos offer insights that help us better understand cur-
rent legal debates. 
The discovery of war manifestos as a set of legal documents 
not previously explored offers lawyers and legal scholars some-
thing rare: a new window into the legal universe of the period 
from the late fifteenth through the early twentieth century. Pre-
viously, scholars frequently relied on treatise authors like Vattel 
to understand the legal universe within which, for example, the 
Framers of the US Constitution existed. But war manifestos give 
scholars direct access to the arguments sovereigns made to one 
another and, therefore, to the kinds of legal claims considered 
valid at the time. That, in turn, casts entirely new light on several 
long-standing debates. Here we explore three:189 first, the intended 
aims of the Founders in writing the US Constitution’s Supremacy 
and Treaty Clauses; second, the long-debated Alien Tort Statute 
 
 189 The first two of these topics are relevant to the United States, as they concern the 
interpretation of the US Constitution and a US statute, respectively. (Although we are 
unable to explore them here, there are likely similar implications for doctrinal questions 
in other countries as well.) The third topic has much broader relevance, as it concerns the 
international rules for use of force. 
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passed by the First Congress; and third, whether to allow war to 
be used for purposes beyond those narrow purposes allowed under 
the UN Charter. 
A. The Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution 
International law, the manifesto database makes clear, was 
once enforced with war. Nearly half of war manifestos cited treaty 
violations as just causes for war. In addition, 42.5 percent of war 
manifestos cited the laws of war, the law of nations, or customary 
international law. For the international legal scholar, this is a 
revelation. Today, there is much hand-wringing about whether 
international law is really law if it is not enforced in the way 
many assume law must be enforced—that is, by the ultimate 
threat of force. Numerous studies, including some by two of the 
authors of this Article, seek to understand why states comply 
with international law, given that it has no police or other mech-
anism for forcing states to abide by the law.190 During the mani-
festos era, by contrast, there was no mystery as to why states 
abided by international law. They did so at least in part because 
failure to do so gave other states a just cause for war. 
Understanding that violating international law was a just 
cause for war—and that states actually waged war for this reason—
casts new light on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.191 
The Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
 
 190 See generally Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement 
in Domestic and International Law, 121 Yale L J 252 (2011); Oona A. Hathaway, Between 
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U Chi L Rev 469 
(2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L J 
1935 (2002). 
 191 For more on the history of the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses, see generally Carlos 
Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial 
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv L Rev 599 (2008); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: 
The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale 
L J 1236 (2008); Tara Helfman, The Law of Nations in The Federalist Papers, 23 J Legal 
Hist 107 (2002); David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations 
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich L Rev 1075 (2000). See also 
Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and 
Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land”, 99 Colum L Rev 2095, 2095–99 (1999); Carlos 
Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am J Intl L 695, 697–
700 (1995). 
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State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.192 
Treaties are thus granted status as “supreme law of the land.” 
Federal courts and judges of every state are bound to enforce 
them, even in the face of contrary state constitutional law. 
But how “supreme” is international law, in fact? In Bond v 
United States,193 the question presented to the US Supreme Court 
was whether Congress had the power under the Constitution to 
enact a criminal law provision necessary to give effect to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention,194 to which the Senate had given 
its advice and consent and which the President had ratified.195 Pe-
titioner argued that the Constitution did not give Congress power 
to enact the law to give effect to the treaty because the law inter-
fered with traditional state authority.196 The Court ultimately did 
not decide the question on which it granted certiorari, deciding 
instead that the statute at hand did not, in fact, regulate peti-
tioner’s conduct.197 The issue could, therefore, be presented to the 
Court again. 
Little discussed at the time of the argument before the 
Court—and what this study of manifestos reveals—is one im-
portant reason the Founders drafted the Supremacy Clause as 
they did. At the time of the Constitution’s drafting, violating a 
treaty was a just cause for war and was routinely cited by states 
in war manifestos. Understanding this phenomenon helps us see 
 
 192 US Const Art VI, cl 2. It is possible that one could make a related argument about 
the Treaty Clause, which provides that a treaty may be made only with the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of senators, and even then, the president is permitted, but not re-
quired, to ratify it. See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. This makes it more difficult to create a 
treaty than to pass legislation. See Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1243–74 (cited in note 191). 
Some have wondered why the Founders made it so much more difficult to make a treaty 
than to pass ordinary legislation. War manifestos may offer a partial clue: entering a 
treaty that the country was not prepared to follow could lead to war. But as earlier schol-
arship has documented, there were many other reasons the clause took the shape it did. See 
generally, for example, Golove, 98 Mich L Rev 1075 (cited in note 191). See also Hathaway, 
117 Yale L J at 1274–1306 (cited in note 191). 
 193 134 S Ct 2077 (2014). 
 194 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Senate Treaty Doc 130-21, 103d 
Cong, 1st Sess 278 (1993). 
 195 See Bond, 134 S Ct at 2083–85. 
 196 See Brief for Petitioner, Bond v United States, No 12-158, *20–23 (US filed May 8, 
2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 1963862). 
 197 See Bond, 134 S Ct at 2090 (finding the conduct not subject to the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention because “the chemicals in this case are not of the sort that an ordinary 
person would associate with instruments of chemical warfare”). 
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that the Framers sought to avoid flinging the fledgling United 
States into war by crafting a constitution that granted the federal 
government power to enforce treaty obligations even in the face of 
inconsistent state law. It also gives new weight to James Madison’s 
argument at the Virginia State Convention on the Constitution 
that “the supremacy of a treaty” was necessary because otherwise 
“as far as [state laws] contravene its operation, it cannot be of any 
effect,” which “would bring on the Union the just charge of na-
tional perfidy, and involve us in war.”198 
Although, as Professor David Golove has noted, there is a 
“paucity of material directly addressing the scope of the treaty 
power” in the Constitutional Convention,199 an analysis of historical 
materials reveals that the risk of war posed by treaty violations 
was widely acknowledged by the Framers and employed in argu-
ments for a stronger national government. In the opening speech 
of the Constitutional Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph set 
the stage by identifying the major “defects of the confederation.”200 
Chief among these defects was that the Articles of Confederation 
“d[id] not provide against foreign invasion. If a State act[ed] 
against a foreign power contrary to the laws of nations or vio-
late[d] a treaty, [the Confederation could not] punish that State, 
or compel its obedience to the treaty. . . . It therefore [could not] 
prevent a war.”201  
Records from the debates and the drafts of the clause reveal 
that the early version of the Supremacy Clause was specifically 
designed to prevent treaty violations by the states—violations 
that could give a just cause for war.202 The Virginia Plan initially 
granted the national legislature the power to “negative all . . . 
laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of 
the national legislature, the articles of Union; or any treaties sub-
sisting under the authority of the Union.”203 In sharp contrast to 
the limited authority granted by the Articles of Confederation, 
this sweeping power provided a way for the national government 
directly and immediately to enforce state compliance with 
 
 198 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution 515 (Lippincott 2d ed 1891).  
 199 Golove, 98 Mich L Rev at 1134 (cited in note 191). 
 200 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 18 (Yale 1911) (Max Farrand, ed). 
 201 Id at 24–25. 
 202 See id at 21, 47, 162, 225. See also id at 54 (noting that the motion to add the words 
“or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union” to the clause was passed by 
unanimous vote “with[ou]t . . . debate or dissent”). 
 203 Id at 225. 
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treaties concluded by the United States. Charles Pinckney argued 
on June 8, 1787 that “the States must be kept in due subordina-
tion to the nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves 
in any case, it w[ould] be impossible to defend the national pre-
rogatives.”204 Pinckney reminded the delegation that, under the 
Articles of Confederation, “foreign treaties [had not] escaped re-
peated violations.”205 On the same day, Madison argued that “an 
indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States [w]as 
absolutely necessary to a perfect system” because “[e]xperience 
had evinced a constant tendency in the States to . . . violate na-
tional Treaties.”206 The New Jersey Plan, a competing draft to the 
Virginia Plan, also made treaties “supreme law of the respective 
States,”207 but it relied on state judiciaries, not the national legis-
lature, to strike down violations of federal laws and treaties.208 
James Madison raised concerns that under this alternative plan, 
the national government could not prevent states from concluding 
their own independent treaties, raising the specter of entangling 
the nation in war.209 Madison reminded the delegation that under 
the Articles, “in several instances, the States have entered into 
treaties [and] wars with them.”210 
Debates at the state conventions were even more explicit 
about the concern that the federal government required a reliable 
and effective power to negotiate and enforce treaties to avoid war. 
At the Virginia convention, delegate William Grayson argued for 
the need to centralize the treaty power in the hands of federal 
authorities: “If I recall rightly, by the law of nations, if a negotia-
tor makes a treaty, in consequence of a power received from a sov-
ereign authority, non-compliance with his stipulations is a just 
cause of war.”211 As noted previously, at the same convention, 
 
 204 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 164 (cited in note 200). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id at 245. 
 208 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 245 (cited in note 200):  
[A]ll Acts of the U. States in Cong[ress] made by virtue & in pursuance of the 
powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties 
made & ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law 
of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the 
said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall 
be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the Indi-
vidual States to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 209 See id at 316. 
 210 Id (emphasis added). 
 211 Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 342 (cited in note 198). 
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Madison, too, made the connection between the Supremacy 
Clause and war explicit.212 And during the New York ratifying 
convention, Robert Livingston argued that the federal judiciary 
should be charged with “the construction of treaties and other 
great national objects” because, “without this, it would be in the 
power of any state to commit the honor of the Union, defeat their 
most beneficial treaties, and involve them in a war.”213 
Publications advocating for the Constitution reflected similar 
concerns. Alexander Hamilton invoked Vattel and Grotius, both 
of whom endorsed a right to war for violations of the law of na-
tions, in a letter criticizing New York for violating the Treaty of 
Peace with Britain:214 by breaching the treaty with Britain, New 
York had brought “infinite injury” to the nation and opened the 
door to reciprocal noncompliance by Britain—including the re-
fusal to “surrender our immensely valuable posts on the frontier, 
and to yield to us a vast tract of western territory.”215 Although 
the United States would have the right to “renew the war to com-
pel a compliance,” those who had assisted the United States 
would be unlikely to support such a war, given the United States’ 
own failure to comply with the treaty.216 
In Federalist 3 and 4, John Jay explicitly referenced the 
threat of war inherent in treaty violations as a key argument to 
convince the nation to ratify the Constitution: “The just causes of 
war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or 
from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no 
less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are 
maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us.”217 As a re-
sult, Jay stated: 
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she ob-
serve the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me 
it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punc-
tually done by one national government than it could be 
 
 212 Id at 515. 
 213 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 215 (cited in note 198). 
 214 See A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan 27, 1784), 
in 3 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1782–1786 483 n 1, 491–92 (Columbia 1962) (Har-
old C. Syrett, ed), citing Vattel, Law of Nations § 4.4.47 at 511 (cited in note 6) and Grotius, 
Law of War and Peace § 3.19.14 at 800 (cited in note 6). 
 215 Letter from Phocion at 489–90 (cited in note 214). 
 216 Id at 492. 
 217 Federalist 3 (Jay), in The Federalist 13, 14 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). 
1212 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1139 
 
either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct 
confederacies.218 
Jay not only recognized that “designed or accidental violations of 
treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war”; he also 
relied on this fact as an argument for adopting the Constitution, 
with its Supremacy Clause.219 Federalist 22, written by Hamilton, 
raises this same concern about the risk of war caused by state 
treaty violations as part of an argument for national unity under 
the new Constitution: “The treaties of the United States, under 
the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen 
different legislatures.”220 As a result, Hamilton argued, “The faith, 
the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually 
at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of 
every member of which it is composed.”221 
At the time the Constitution was written, not only was treaty 
violation a just cause for war—as evidenced by war manifestos 
and treatises of the time—but the Framers were aware that it 
was. They framed the Supremacy Clause as they did in no small 
part to ensure that the US government would have the power to 
enforce the treaty obligations of the United States even in the face 
of recalcitrant state governments, thus avoiding giving treaty 
partners a just cause for war. There are, of course, many views on 
the proper place of historical evidence in constitutional interpre-
tation. Indeed, some might argue that originalism is ill-suited for 
the Supremacy Clause, insofar as the Constitution was drafted 
for a very different international order than the one we currently 
inhabit. But to the extent that understanding the original meaning 
and intent of the text of the Supremacy Clause are important to 
resolving the issue presented to (but not resolved by) the Court in 
Bond, understanding this underappreciated context is essential. 
B. The Alien Tort Claims Act 
The discovery of war manifestos also offers a new perspective 
on another long-standing debate—this time over the meaning of 
 
 218 Id at 14–15. 
 219 Id at 16. Jay reiterates this point in Federalist 4, stating that “the safety of the 
people of America against dangers from foreign force depends . . . on their forbearing to 
give just causes of war to other nations.” Federalist 4 (Jay), in The Federalist 18, 18 (Wes-
leyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). 
 220 Federalist 22 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 135, 144 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). 
 221 Id (emphasis added). 
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the Alien Tort Claims Act222 (ATCA) (also referred to as the “Alien 
Tort Statute”). Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the 
statute provides, “The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”223 
Since the statute’s rediscovery in Filartiga v Pena-Irala,224 law-
yers have been struggling to make sense of this vague statute. 
Clearly it grants jurisdiction to federal courts over torts commit-
ted against aliens, but under what circumstances? And exactly 
why did the First Congress create this odd statute? 
In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,225 the Court struggled to under-
stand the purpose of the statute. It noted, for example, that “[t]he 
sparse contemporaneous cases and legal materials referring to 
the [ATCA] tend to confirm both inferences, that some, but few, 
torts in violation of the law of nations were understood to be 
within the common law.”226 The Court determined that the statute 
was primarily jurisdictional but that it “furnish[ed] jurisdiction 
for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law 
of nations” as long as they “rest on a norm of international char-
acter accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we 
have recognized.”227 This decision limited the scope of liability un-
der the ATCA to well-established violations of customary inter-
national law. 
In Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum,228 the Supreme Court in-
itially granted certiorari in order to address the question whether 
 
 222 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 76–77, 28 USC § 1350.  
 223 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 76–77. The text has been slightly modified over 
the years. The original text read: “[The district courts] shall also have cognizance, concur-
rent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all 
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat 73. 
 224 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980). 
 225 542 US 692 (2004). 
 226 Id at 720. 
 227 Id at 720, 725. See also id at 732. 
 228 569 US 108 (2013). For an earlier treatment of aliens’ tort claims, see Mostyn v 
Fabrigas, 98 Eng Rep 1021, 1030 (KB 1774) (“[A]ll actions of a transitory nature that arise 
abroad may be laid as happening in an English county.”); Dennick v Railroad Co, 103 US 
11, 17–18 (1880): 
Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of 
action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be en-
forced and the right of action pursued in any court which has jurisdiction of such 
matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties. 
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corporations could be held liable under the Act.229 After oral argu-
ment, however, the Court ordered reargument on a new question: 
“Whether and under what circumstances the [ATCA] allows 
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States.”230 In arguing that the ATCA did allow extra-
territorial application, petitioners relied heavily on the transitory 
torts doctrine, a common-law doctrine that allowed courts to as-
sume jurisdiction over torts arising abroad.231 The Court found 
that doctrine inapplicable, however.232 It did acknowledge that of-
fenses against ambassadors violated the law of nations and “if not 
adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war.”233 Therefore, 
“[t]he [ATCA] ensured that the United States could provide a fo-
rum for adjudicating such incidents.”234 But the Court then con-
cluded that “[n]othing about this historical context suggests that 
Congress also intended federal common law under the [ATCA] to 
provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in the territory of 
another sovereign.”235 
The evidence from manifestos offers insight into each of these 
open issues. To begin with, it reveals why the First Congress 
might have passed such a statute. The frequency with which sov-
ereigns referenced violations of the law of nations, as well as tor-
tious interference, in their war manifestos offers an answer: they 
were concerned about furnishing a just cause of war. In the man-
ifestos database, 141 manifestos out of 332—or 42.5 percent—
cited violations of the law of nations as a cause of war, and 150 
manifestos out of 332—or 45.2 percent—raised tortious interfer-
ence. Violations of the law of nations were not mere lapses of “mo-
rality,” as some today might argue, but instead were just causes 
for war. 
It is one thing for violations of the law of nations to be a just 
cause of war. But the idea that torts could—and frequently did—
lead to war is illuminating. No one today would consider the in-
fliction of a civil injury for which money damages are the appro-
priate compensation to be a legitimate ground for war. That it 
 
 229 See Kiobel, 569 US at 114. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Petitioners’ Supplemental Reply Brief, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, No 10-
1491, *9–10 (US filed Aug 31, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 3864274). 
 232 Kiobel, 569 US at 119. 
 233 Id at 123, citing Sosa, 542 US at 715. 
 234 Id at 124. 
 235 Id. 
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was commonly cited as a cause of war offers a possible explana-
tion for the otherwise mysterious ATCA: the Founders were seek-
ing to, once again, avoid giving foreign sovereigns a just cause for 
war. By giving jurisdiction over these cases to the federal courts, 
the First Congress sought to ensure that any tortious injuries 
would be remedied in court—not through war. At the time, a num-
ber of state jurisdictions excluded aliens from eligibility to file suit 
over torts in state court, leaving them without recourse to a court 
of law and with an unresolved grievance that could lead to war. 
Although the ATCA’s historical origins are “murky,”236 there 
is supporting evidence suggesting that the Framers were con-
cerned that tortious wrongs against a citizen could lead to war. 
Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations, which was widely read and 
frequently cited at the time of the Founding, stated that unrec-
ompensed wrongs by citizens of one state against another could 
be a just cause of war: “If a sovereign, who might keep his subjects 
within the rules of justice and peace, suffers them to injure a for-
eign nation, either in its body or its members, he does no less in-
jury to that nation, than if he injured them himself.”237 Vattel 
 
 236 William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to 
the “Originalists”, 19 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 221, 222 (1996). For additional histori-
cal work on the ATCA, see generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, Two 
Myths about the Alien Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L Rev 1609 (2014); Anthony J. Bellia 
Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U Chi L Rev 
445 (2011); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum 
L Rev 830 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va J Intl L 
587 (2002); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 
Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 445 (1995); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and 
the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am J Intl L 461 (1989); William R. Casto, 
The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law 
of Nations, 18 Conn L Rev 467 (1986); Anthony D’Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the 
Founding of the Constitution, 82 Am J Intl L 62 (1988); John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Stat-
ute and How Individuals “Violate” International Law, 21 Vand J Transnatl L 47 (1988). 
 237 Vattel, Law of Nations 2.6.72 at 161 (cited in note 6). Blackstone, too, explained 
that “offences against the law of nations . . . are principally incident to whole states or 
nations: in which case recourse can only be had to war.” But nations could be held respon-
sible for the actions of their citizens: 
[W]here the individuals of any state violate this general law, it is then the inter-
est as well as the duty of the government under which they live, to animadvert 
upon them with a becoming severity, that the peace of the world may be main-
tained. For in vain would nations in their collective capacity observe these uni-
versal rules, if private subjects were at liberty to break them at their own dis-
cretion, and involve the two states in a war. It is therefore incumbent upon the 
nation injured, first to demand satisfaction and justice to be done on the of-
fender, by the state to which he belongs; and, if that be refused or neglected, the 
sovereign then avows himself an accomplice or abettor of his subject’s crime, and 
draws upon his community the calamities of foreign war. 
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endorsed a right to war for precisely such reasons: “Let us then 
say in general, that the foundation, or cause of every just war is 
injury, either already done, or threatened.”238 
In a grand jury charge delivered to the Circuit Court of the 
District of Virginia, John Jay references Vattel’s Law of Nations 
and describes the international consequences of a state failing to 
address injuries against aliens, whether committed by the state 
or a private citizen: 
If a Sovereign, who might keep his Subjects within the Rules 
of Justice and Peace, suffers them to injure a foreign Nation, 
either in its Body or its Members, he does no less Injury to 
that Nation, than if he injured them himself. In short, the 
Safety of the State, and that of human Society, requires this 
attention from every sovereign.239 
In Federalist 80, Hamilton expresses a similar concern: 
As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of 
courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed 
among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal 
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the 
citizens of other countries are concerned.240 
He continued, “This is not less essential to the preservation of the 
public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity.”241 An 
“unredressed” wrong on a foreign national, after all, was “an ag-
gression upon his sovereign.”242 At the North Carolina ratifying 
convention, William Davie also worried about unrecompensed 
harm leading to war: 
It has been laid down by all writers that the denial of justice 
is one of the just causes of war. If these controversies were 
left to the decision of particular states, it would be in their 
power, at any time, to involve the continent in a war, usually 
the greatest of all national calamities.243 
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Less than a decade before the enactment of the ATCA by the 
First Congress under the new Constitution, a committee of the 
Second Continental Congress, operating under the Articles of 
Confederation, recommended that states enact laws to punish in-
fractions of the laws of nations, reporting: “That the scheme of 
criminal justice in the several states does not sufficiently compre-
hend offenses against the law of nations.”244 And: 
[A]s instances may occur, in which, for the avoidance of war, 
it may be expedient to repair out of the public treasury inju-
ries committed by individuals, and the property of the inno-
cent be exposed to reprisal, the author of those injuries 
should compensate the damage out of his private fortune.245 
In response, the Second Continental Congress resolved in 1781 
that states should address the problem by providing “expeditious, 
exemplary, and adequate punishment” for various harms to for-
eign states, including “offenses against the law of nations” and by 
“authoriz[ing] suits to be instituted for damages by the party in-
jured.”246 This did not suffice to address the problem, however. 
Just three years later, the 1784 Marbois Affair, in which French 
citizen Charles Julian de Longchamps assaulted French Consul 
General François Barbé-Marbois on the streets of Philadelphia, 
highlighted the United States’ continuing impotence to address 
torts against aliens.247 
A post-ATCA case likewise reaffirms the understanding at 
the time that an unrecompensed wrong against a private citizen 
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 247 See generally Alfred Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 Pa Magazine 
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could lead to war. In Henfield’s Case,248 an American citizen was 
criminally prosecuted for assisting the capture of a British mer-
chant ship by a French privateer. The court, once again citing 
Vattel, held that, when a citizen commits a wrong against a citi-
zen of another country, “his nation should oblige him to repair the 
damage, if reparation can be made, or should punish him accord-
ing to the measure of his offence.”249 If it fails to do so, “it renders 
itself in some measure an accomplice in the guilt, and becomes 
responsible for the injury. . . . To what does this responsibility 
lead? To reprisal certainly . . . ; and if so, probably to war.”250 
 The backdrop provided by war manifestos, together with con-
temporaneous expressions of concern that unrecompensed tor-
tious wrongs against aliens could lead to war, may help to explain 
why there was so little debate over the ATCA at the time it was 
enacted. The members of the First Congress would have under-
stood that providing recourse in US courts for aliens who had 
been harmed was essential to protecting national security. Euro-
pean states eager for an excuse to launch a just war against the 
newly independent United States could have seized on any signif-
icant number of torts as an excuse for war—and a legally valid 
one at that. 
This treatment of torts suggests, too, an answer to the ques-
tion left open by the Supreme Court after Kiobel: Does the ATCA 
apply to so-called foreign squared cases—that is, cases of torts 
committed against aliens within the United States or outside the 
United States by a US resident? The evidence from war manifes-
tos suggests a clear answer: yes. Many of the tort claims made by 
sovereigns during the manifesto era related to encounters that 
took place on the high seas or otherwise outside the reach of ordi-
nary courts. Indeed, it is precisely because the disputes could not 
be solved by courts that they had to be resolved by war. 
C. The Permitted Reasons for War Are Limited 
Today we frequently take for granted that there are limited 
reasons that states are permitted to go to war. But war manifes-
tos reveal that this was not always true. In fact, it has only been 
true for less than a century. Before it was outlawed by the Kellogg-
Briand Pact in 1928, war was considered a legitimate means of 
 
 248 11 F Cases 1099 (CC D Pa 1793). 
 249 Id at 1108. 
 250 Id, citing Vattel, Law of Nations 2.6.76 at 251 (cited in note 6). 
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resolving a wide range of disputes among sovereigns. Manifestos 
offer stark evidence that sovereigns not only went to war for a 
range of reasons that today would be considered impermissible, 
but also that they publicized those reasons to their fellow sover-
eigns and to their populations precisely because they were consid-
ered valid justifications. Understanding manifestos and the role 
of war in sovereign relations for five centuries changes our under-
standing of war’s role in the world order and, indeed, of the world 
order itself. War was not a violation of the law; it was the law. 
That is, of course, no longer true today. As two of us have 
argued,251 that changed largely thanks to the decision to outlaw war 
in 1928, a decision reinforced and reaffirmed in the UN Charter. 
As noted at the opening of this Article, today the only permitted 
reasons for war are (1) UN Security Council authorized interven-
tions, (2) self-defense, and (3) consent of the host state. 
Viewing the array of “just causes” for war given in war man-
ifestos offers a vision of an alternative universe in which war 
could be used for a much wider range of purposes than those per-
mitted today. War served as an all-purpose tool for states—one 
they could pull out when they judged that the causes were suffi-
cient to justify it. 
Consider humanitarian intervention. Some think of humani-
tarian intervention as a recent invention—an outgrowth of the 
human rights revolution of the post–World War II era. But the 
history of manifestos suggests the opposite: humanitarian inter-
vention is very old indeed. Of the 1,381 just war claims made in 
332 manifestos from our collection, 64 made claims of humanitar-
ian intervention, constituting 4.6 percent of all claims and con-
tained in 19.3 percent of all manifestos. Put differently, an aver-
age of 19.3 percent of all wars covered by the war manifestos in 
the study were waged, at least in part, for humanitarian reasons. 
After learning this, it is difficult to think of humanitarian inter-
vention as a modern invention. 
In 1528, for example, Conrad von Bibra, Duke in Franconia 
and eventual Prince-Bishop of Würzburg, issued a manifesto 
against the Duke John of Saxony, Prince Elector (of the Holy Roman 
Empire), and Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, in which he claimed a 
just cause to intervene in defense of the oppressed Protestant pop-
ulation—arguably an excuse for launching one of many 
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internecine battles that plagued Germany in this period.252 Hu-
manitarian reasons were also cited by sovereigns in situations 
that led to colonial or semicolonial relationships. John Milton, the 
great epic poet, wrote a manifesto for Oliver Cromwell justifying 
the invasion of the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean in part on 
the basis of the brutality of the conquistadors. Warships should be 
employed, he argued, “in avenging the blood of the English, as well 
as that of the poor Indians, which in those places has been so un-
justly, so cruelly, and so often shed by the hands of the Spaniards.”253 
Another pointed example of a humanitarian intervention ar-
gument comes from US President William McKinley in an 1898 
Declaration of War during the Spanish-American War. McKinley 
argued that “the forcible intervention of the United States as a 
neutral to stop the war” was “justifiable on rational grounds.”254 
Those grounds included “the cause of humanity and to put an end 
to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries 
now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either 
unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate”; it also included giving 
Cuban citizens the “protection and indemnity for life and property 
which no government there can or will afford.”255 “It is no answer,” 
he claimed, “to say this is all in another country, belonging to an-
other nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially 
our duty, for it is right at our door.”256 This intervention touched 
off decades of interventions in Cuba, the effects of which continue 
to be seen today in the “lease” of the land on which the infamous 
Guantanamo Bay prison now lies. A few years later, President 
Theodore Roosevelt defended the invasion of Cuba on the grounds 
that “there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and 
of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our 
manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the 
deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it.”257 
These humanitarian interventions were legally appropriate 
at the time, if morally questionable. Sovereigns saw wrongs that 
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they wished to set right and saw no peaceful means for doing so. 
Hence, they went to war. 
Viewed from the present, however, this history of humanitar-
ian intervention ought to give us pause. In a world in which states 
were permitted to unilaterally declare their just causes for war, 
unilateral humanitarian intervention is permissible. But in a 
world in which many of the reasons for which states once justifi-
ably went to war are no longer permitted reasons for war, the uni-
lateral resort to war to right wrongs is a contravention of these 
constraints. It hearkens back to an era when war was an instru-
ment of justice to which states always had unilateral recourse. If 
a state can choose on its own to go to war for this historic purpose, 
why not to collect debts or to redress a tortious injury or to remedy 
a treaty violation? 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article has aimed to unearth a previously unexplored 
set of legal documents: war manifestos. War manifestos offer a 
tool for observing and understanding the emergence of the mod-
ern nation-state in the late fifteenth century and the five centu-
ries of state practice that followed. They allow us a rare oppor-
tunity to gaze directly into a world long lost. The discovery of war 
manifestos gives scholars and lawyers a new set of materials for 
exploring the very foundations of our international legal order. 
From war manifestos, we learn how different the world once 
looked. States once viewed force as an appropriate tool for resolv-
ing a wide range of disputes. But they also used manifestos to 
avoid war—and, in the process, developed a shared understand-
ing of norms that guided their conduct. 
The implications described here are, we hope, just the begin-
ning. We invite our readers to examine the manifestos them-
selves, to find in them the deep foundations of the international 
legal order. This new set of documents will allow us to develop a 
better understanding of the world as it once was and, in the pro-
cess, gain new perspective on legal dilemmas we face today. 
APPENDIX:  METHODOLOGY 
The collection of manifestos on which this Article is based was 
collected and coded over the course of three years. The collection 
contains a total of 573 documents: 264 manifestos, 68 counter-man-
ifestos, and 53 quasi-manifestos, 129 documents that were coded 
and determined not to be manifestos, 27 documents that we 
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identified but could not locate, and 31 duplicates in other lan-
guages. Here we explain the process used to generate this database. 
The War Manifestos Database, hosted by Yale Law School’s 
library at http://documents.law.yale.edu/manifestos, includes a 
list of all of the manifestos used in this article, along with links to 
nearly all of the manifestos themselves. We encourage readers to 
help us continue to grow the collection; information on how to do 
so is available on the website. 
A. Assembling the Collection 
The manifestos in the collection were collected in several 
ways: 
1. Historical collections. 
We searched Morris Yale Law Library Catalog; Orbis Yale 
University Catalog; WorldCat, which searches a database of 72,000 
libraries in 170 countries; Karlsruhe Virtueller Katalog, which 
searches a collection of research libraries in Germany, Austria, 
and Switzerland; Copac National Academic & Specialist Library 
Catalogue, which searches libraries within the UK; national li-
brary databases, including Bibliothèque Nationale de France and 
National Library Service of Italy; Early English Books Online; 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online; and the Hathi Trust 
Digital Catalog Record of British and foreign state papers. This re-
search process amassed several hundred documents. 
2. Drawing on prior research. 
We began with the most comprehensive study of manifestos 
to date, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen in der Frühen Neuzeit, by 
Professor Tischer. It covered the period from 1492 to 1800 and 
contained an appendix listing roughly 300 documents. We 
searched for these titles in library databases and online. We were 
able to locate all but 27. We found that 110 of the documents in 
that study did not meet our definition of a manifesto; of these 110, 
46 met our definition of quasi-manifestos. 
3. Newspaper collections. 
We searched a variety of sources to find manifestos published 
in newspapers, including Yale University Library, European His-
tory: Newspapers, Yale University Library, online at http://guides 
.library.yale.edu/c.php?g=296299&p=1974321 (including links to 
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twentieth- and twenty-first-century newspapers on microfilm at 
Yale University Library, Orbis online database, digitized French 
newspapers on Gallica, and Wikisource Zeitschriften with German-
language serials); Yale University Library, Early Modern British 
History: Newspapers, Periodicals, and Diaries, online at http:// 
guides.library.yale.edu/c.php?g=295930&p=1973048 (including 
links to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Burney Collection 
newspapers, nineteenth-century British Library newspapers, 
British Periodicals I and II from the UMI microfilm collection, 
ProQuest Periodicals Archive Online, Waterloo Directory of 
English Newspapers and Periodicals (1800–1900), Historical 
Newspapers Online’s index to The Times (London), Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online, Early English Books Online, Times of 
London (1785–1985), Georgian and early Victorian regional news-
papers (1750’s–1870’s), British Printed Images to 1700, and British 
and Irish Women’s Letters and Diaries 1500–1950 (Alexander 
Street Press)); Gallica Bibliothèque Nationale de France 
(http://gallica.bnf.fr); seventeenth- to eighteenth-century Burney 
Collection Newspapers (http://find.galegroup.com/bncn). We used 
the following key terms: “manifesto” (English, Italian, Spanish); 
“manifeste” (French); “manifest” (English, German); “kriegsbe-
gründungen” (German); “reasons for war”; and “declaration of 
war.” 
4. Working from conflicts. 
We also identified a number of manifestos based on individual 
conflicts listed in the Correlates of War Database. As part of an-
other data project, we examined every instance in the Correlates 
of War Territorial Change Database in which territory was trans-
ferred during a military conflict.258 During the course of our re-
search, we examined historical documents surrounding these con-
flicts. We aimed to identify any manifesto or counter-manifesto 
that may have been exchanged. This process identified forty-
seven potential war manifestos. In addition, if the collection in-
cluded a counter-manifesto from a conflict but the collection did 
not appear to include the original manifesto, we again searched 
through the documents relating to that conflict to try to identify 
the original manifesto. 
 
 258 For more on this data project and the sources used to create it, see Oona A. Hathaway 
and Scott J. Shapiro, Conquest and State Size Database (2017), online at http://www 
.theinternationalistsbook.com/data.html (visited Apr 29, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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Despite these efforts, the collection certainly does not contain 
all war manifestos. First, many—perhaps most—manifestos have 
not survived to the present. Second, manifestos that have been 
digitized are more accessible and are therefore overrepresented 
in the collection. Third, documents that used the term “manifesto” 
were also more easily located and thus are likely overrepresented. 
Nonetheless, our collection represents the single largest collection 
of war manifestos ever amassed. Representing nearly 400 mani-
festos and quasi-manifestos (as well as over 100 more documents 
deemed not to be manifestos or quasi-manifestos), the collection 
represents over four years of effort by a team of over thirty schol-
ars, researchers, and librarians. 
B. Coding 
Researchers working under our supervision read and coded 
each manifesto. Each researcher was trained in an hour-long ori-
entation session that outlined the method of coding, the defini-
tions of each code, and examples of each code. Although there was 
not a systematized intercoder reliability analysis, given the time-
consuming nature of the coding process (and the very specialized 
language skills required to read some of the manifestos), we un-
dertook a variety of efforts to ensure reliability and consistency. 
In particular, through most of the research period, there were 
team meetings between coders and the authors to discuss work, 
raise questions, and ensure consistent understanding of the cod-
ing process. The authors frequently checked in with coders and, 
when language skills made it possible, spot-checked the work. In 
addition, at the conclusion of the coding process, nearly every 
manifesto was individually reviewed for consistency and accu-
racy. (In many cases, coders were asked to annotate manifestos 
with brief translations, which made it possible to check coding of 
most manifestos in languages the authors do not themselves 
read.) This process ensures that false positives are unlikely—if a 
reason was listed in the spreadsheet, it is unlikely that this cod-
ing was incorrect, as it was annotated and almost always de-
scribed and discussed in group meetings. More likely are false 
negatives—it is possible that coders will have missed justifica-
tions offered in the manifestos. An effort was made to minimize 
these errors through re-reading and spot-checking the manifes-
tos, but that was not possible for every manifesto. 
Coders were asked to read each manifesto and determine the 
particular reasons that the issuing sovereign gave to justify the 
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proposed war. The spreadsheet included twelve reasons that have 
been given over time to justify war: enforcement of inheritance 
laws, succession rules, and other hereditary rights; self-defense 
and repelling aggression; balance of power concerns; tortious 
wrongs, injuries to property or life; collection of debts; protection 
of trade interests; protection of diplomatic relations; humanitar-
ian considerations; religious claims, including defense of the one 
true church and religious freedom; violation of treaty obligations; 
references to “laws of war;” and other reasons. See Part IV for a 
complete definition, and examples, of each. 
